Deliberative democracy and/or “participatory democracy” were the most sophisticated concepts used by the opposition during the Gezi Park protests. The protesters used these concepts to argue that the “people” demand participatory/deliberative democracy as in developed Western democracies; in other words, they want to have a say in such decisions taken by authorities as the Taksim Square project. However, as they were unaware of these concepts were conceptualized by two preeminent philosophers, Jurgen Habermas and John Rawls, everybody attributed a different meaning to these concepts. For instance, a columnist limited deliberative democracy to the presence of four simple factors only. (1) As they were unaware of the ongoing debates around these concepts in political science, an oasis of ‘deliberative democracy’ was created, giving the image that each and every group of the society, including the religious would be able to participate in the decision making process. The concept was surrounded by all the ‘right’ rosy concepts of our times: ‘culture of coexistence, ‘pluralism’, ‘rejection of us vs. them’, ‘compromise.'(2) Unfortunately no one has mentioned the discrimination and prejudices against religion and religious people that Rawls’ and Habermas’ deliberative democracy hid. In fact, the concept of deliberative democracy rests on the assumption of a liberal society and hegemony of a secular language and mentality. Both Rawls and Habermas, as will be explained below, put the most burden on religious citizens for making possible the deliberation/participation process.
The concept of deliberative democracy was introduced to maximize the legitimacy of decision-making processes in a pluralist and liberal society, and secular state based on the separation of religion and the state. The idea behind these concepts is that if citizens can understand themselves as the authors of the laws they will later be obliged to obey, neither legality nor legitimacy of decisions will be challenged. As Habermas argues, “For all their ongoing dissent on questions of world views and religious doctrines, citizens are meant to respect one another as free and equal members of their political community. And on this basis of civic solidarity when it comes to contentious political issues they are expected to look for a way to reach a rationally motivated agreement—they owe one another good reasons.” (3) Lets’s see what these “good” reasons are.
PUBLIC REASON
According to Rawls, “good” reasons are reasons that are compatible with his concept of “public reason,” Which is essentially secular. Rawls explains that comprehensive doctrines such as religions apply to a wide range of concerns in a person’s life and they offer a moral conception on what is “good.” However, a citizen cannot expect his moral conception of the good to be shared by all citizens in a democratic society. Therefore, Rawls introduces a conception of justice which is meant to apply to constitutional essentials and basic matters of justice common to all citizens whether they are religious or not. Rawls calls this the “political conception of justice.” According to Rawls, religious citizens are both individuals and “citizens” in a public sphere. Therefore, while religious people state or justify their views about political issues, they should act in congruence with “public reason” on which other citizens will also agree. The controversial issue of euthanasia stands as a good example: A religious person may cite God’s commandment in rejection euthanasia. He or she may say that only God gives and takes away. However, according to Rawls, a religious citizen cannot vote “in favor” or “against” euthanasia by relying on the commandments and prohibitions from God. This is because secular citizens will refuse to consider these commandments and forbiddance from God as legitimate
