Sharing power is never easy. Politics thrives on accumulating more power. Empires are built around it. You can defeat your opponents by stick or by carrot, but either way you need power.
And this is where the dilemma of power lies: The more power you have, the less secure you are. The reason is that power without legitimacy is only a curse. The power that is not shared can only create more foes than you need.
The power struggle in Turkish politics is a good example of how power with different paradigms of legitimacy can lead to friction and polarization. The battle between democrats and militant secularists in Turkey is not simply a matter of who has or should have more power. The issue is one of category, not degree. While the secularist establishment defines legitimacy through loyalty to the state, others take it to be rooted in the popular will.
What makes an institution, a party or an individual legitimate according to a secularist establishment is their blind adherence to the state ideology. Everything else is defined accordingly: the constitution, the judiciary, the parliament, the bureaucracy are responsible not to the people but to the state. That is why a member of Parliament is able to say in regard to the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) closure case that the judges are not responsible for the social, economic and political consequences of their legal decisions. What matters is their strict application of the law.
This is pure and simple logic. But what if the laws are flawed? What if they are designed to protect the state, not the citizens? Aren’t the laws there to establish order, peace and justice among people? Aren’t the laws supposed to protect the individual against the state? In other words, can laws have a reference other than the wellbeing and peace of the citizens?
Regardless of the outcome of the closure case against the AK Party, the judicial system in Turkey will continue to be discussed both by Turks themselves and by others. There is already a major debate going on about the legitimacy of the current Constitution and the laws that prohibit or limit freedom of expression and give excessive powers to the state and its organs. Undoubtedly, the debate will lead to a better constitution and a better legal system in Turkey. The question is how much of a price Turkey will have to pay for a truly democratic system without undemocratic interventions masquerading as the law.
The debate is also taking place outside Turkey. European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso’s speech at the Turkish Parliament last week raised the issue of shared sovereignty again. The gist of Barroso’s message was that Turkey is a negotiating partner to the European Union and that means that the EU has a right to be concerned about the standards of democracy in Turkey.
Is this not interference in Turkish internal affairs? In a sense, it is. But it is more of a case of sharing sovereignty with a larger body of which you are member. This is what Turkey is obliged to do with the UN, NATO, the OSCE, the European Convention of Human Rights and a host of other international organizations and treaties that Turkey has joined as a sovereign country. The only exception with the EU system is that it is much more extensive and yes, intrusive.
But is this something new? Didn’t we know this all along when we applied for full membership in the EU? Have we suddenly awoken to the solemn fact that being a member of any organization means sharing your power, rights, privileges and sovereignty with others?
This is all common sense. But for it to work in the Turkish context, the Europeans need to be more explicit and promising over Turkey’s full EU membership. The case against the AK Party has certainly strengthened the hands of the anti-Turkey camp in Europe. Now they have a wonderful excuse to default Turkey on its democratic credentials.
Paradoxical as it may seem, this is exactly why the EU should act now and speed up the membership process so that such democrat