One year has passed since the Gezi Park protests, which began on May 31, 2013 and rapidly evolved into a wave of mass demonstrations and died down after approximately two weeks. Since then, various groups have reproduced the revolts with reference to their respective identities and political agendas.
During the initial week, the protests appealed to a large base through environmentalist sentiments as well as reactions against gentrification, government rhetoric and police brutality. The movement thus gained a diverse and unmistakably young following. The second week of protests, in contrast, witnessed the rise of a political organization with an anti-government portfolio. Lacking leadership, coordination and objectives, the masses found themselves stuck between the government’s charges of organizing a coup and the opposition’s revolutionary pipe dreams. Diversity slowly disappeared, leaving behind radical student organizations with little to offer but Kemalist clichés.
Over the past year, pro-Gezi commentators have reproduced the memory of the first week of protests. Short of any political claims except resistance to democratization efforts, the left sought to conceal its failures by praising the opposition movement. They thought each political conflict and government misstep presented an opportunity to respawn the protests and field young people to the streets. In truth, the turnout ended up limited to a handful of organizations as the Gezi Park protests became a symbol for anti-democratic struggle.
The government, in turn, grasped that its efforts to control the political center and democratize the political system had failed to generate endless political power and, of all things, had formed the basis of a serious opposition movement. Believing that the opposition sought to remove the government from power and reverse the gains of their democratic struggle, supporters rallied behind the prime minister.
The two clashing views of the protests caused the power struggle in Turkey to become increasingly harsh as political tensions grew. As the opposition platform shifted its emphasis from democratization to identity politics over secular lifestyles, its methodology of choice became street revolts as opposed to election victory. As such, the Gezi Park protests not only failed to represent a positive force in Turkish politics to overcome various institutional problems but also allowed populist anger and occasional hate speech to hijack mainstream political opposition.
Marking the first anniversary of the urban revolts, it remains difficult to claim that the country’s newfound opposition movement made any positive contribution to addressing pressing issues. In contrast, the political polarization that the protests unleashed actively hurt the prospect of resolving structural problems through dialogue.
At a time when, despite its shortcomings, the country enjoys broader representation than ever, efforts to identify the streets as the only viable avenue for political opposition limit the possibility of tackling problems through political debate. This tendency, which emerged as a reaction to the AK Party’s platform, gradually turned into a rejection of the political process. In light of these developments, last summer’s urban revolts hardly present an optimistic picture for its legacy.
[Daily Sabah, July 2, 2014]
