Egypt experienced a military coup two years after the first major revolution of the 21st century. The Chief of General Staff and Defense Minister Abdel Fatah al Sisi announced in a televised speech that President Mohammed Morsi was dismissed from office and the Constitution was suspended. The anti-Morsi protestors gathering at the Tahrir Square read this as a popular revolution; and for the pro-Morsi groups who gathered at the Rabiatul Adawiyah Square to support the president, this was a “military coup.” As it is seen, both the squares and the sides have been divided into two in Egypt. The very same split is valid for ideologies, too. Those who jot down June 30 as a “popular revolution” say that this attempt aims to protect democracy against the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhvan) who tried to steal away the January 25 Revolution from the Egyptian people. When we push aside everything and evaluate the situation, it is a fact that a chief of general staff announced the removal of a president from office. This is beyond all discussions and without any doubt a military coup d’etat. If we put aside the proponents of the old regime; the pro-revolution liberals and seculars, Copts and a segment of Salafis issued statements from the pulpit of the Egyptian Armed Forces in support of General Sisi. Therefore, a process of political repositioning by the actors and molding the sphere of politics continues.
“WHY DID IT GO WRONG?”
First of all, it should be noted that starting from Bernard Lewis’ famous paradigm “What went wrong”, and looking for the mistakes of all the groups who stood against the ousted President Morsi or the military in the political arena will take us to determinism and reflect that all of the developments were simply inescapable. This “inescapability” – if we presume that social groups giving shoulder to the Muslim Brotherhood will neither evaporate nor come to existence in a minute – will bring us the conclusion that democracy will never exist in Egypt, or even in the entire Middle East in a broader sense. But instead, it is necessary to determine the primary tension in the political conflict and give meaning to it.
THE ‘LEGITIMACY’ AS AN AXIS OF CONFLICT
During his address to the nation, Morsi concentrated on two main issues: “This Constitution is legitimate and I am an elected president, so I am legitimate.” He used the word “legitimate” 74 times in the speech and that shows us Morsi’s focal point and main claim. On the other hand, the political road map that the Chief of General Staff Sisi announced referred to the suspension of the Constitution and the dismissal of Morsi from the presidential post. It has been solidified and revealed in Sisi’s statement that neither Morsi nor the Constitution is legitimate according to the opposition. The opposition’s actors speaking at the Armed Forces’ rostrum confirmed this road map. The Tamarrud (Revolt) Movement, which had called for the protests of June 30, named Morsi as “the dictator” and this also stressed the axis of conflict regarding the legitimacy. The opposition’s main claim was that Morsi lost his legitimacy. Then, we have two questions at this point: Were the Constitution and the President legitimate?
When we evaluate the procedures for both, we see that the Constitution was put to a popular vote and endorsed as a result of a fair referendum as confirmed by the international observers. The Founding Assembly to prepare the draft constitution, likewise, had set out to work as a legitimately elected body. Besides, the constitution was adopted just a year ago, so it is impossible to think that it survived the social change with the support of the status quo. Similarly, Morsi was elected in the second round to the Presidential Office in an election confirmed by the international observers. Therefore, it is necessary to talk about a legitimacy conflict other than the
