Iran and the United States are returning to the negotiating table after a long hiatus. Following then-President Trump's unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the nuclear deal, in 2018, relations between the two countries steadily deteriorated. Sanctions, mutual threats, and indirect regional confrontations pushed both sides – and the entire region – to the brink of danger.
Under both the Biden and Raisi administrations, public remarks about negotiations largely served as diplomatic posturing, with little real progress. Deep-seated mistrust between the two sides prevented any substantial moves toward genuine dialogue.
This time, however, both Iran and the U.S. appear genuinely willing to engage in dialogue and reach an agreement. The talks will take place on Saturday, April 11, in Oman, between delegations led by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and U.S. Special Representative for the Middle East Steve Witkoff. These negotiations hold the potential for far-reaching consequences at both bilateral and regional levels. We asked experts in the field to assess the situation from multiple angles. Here, we present their evaluations and insights.
How do the Trump administration and various US political actors approach Iran-US negotiations?
The Trump administration’s approach to foreign policy is fundamentally shaped by the “America First” perspective. Therefore, all foreign policy decisions need to be evaluated within this framework, and understanding this policy is essential. At its core, this perspective is based on a strategy aimed at reducing foreign policy commitments that impose additional financial burdens on American taxpayers.
On the other hand, the continuation of the security support provided to Israel under the Qualitative Military Edge (QME) framework constitutes a significant budgetary cost for the U.S. These costs have especially increased under the Biden administration following the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas incursion.
A potential Iran-Israel conflict would further raise this burden. Thus, by maintaining the “maximum pressure” policy, Trump seeks to bring Iran’s nuclear program down to peaceful levels, thereby minimizing the threats posed to Israel. This strategy involves keeping the negotiation process active while simultaneously tightening sanctions against Iran when necessary. In this context, particular attention is given to closely monitoring Iran’s oil sales to China, which the U.S. aims to strictly control. This also reflects Trump’s broader trade war against China, as one of his goals is to weaken economic ties between Iran and China.
Another important aspect of the process is the approval of the U.S. Congress. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (INARA) grants Congress the authority to review and approve any nuclear agreement made with Iran. This law is intended to prevent the executive branch from unilaterally signing agreements and to enhance Congressional oversight.
As talks with Iran progress, members of Congress, influenced by the pro-Israel lobby, may oppose Trump’s actions. However, the support Trump receives from the Republican Party base is a significant factor that Congress members seeking reelection cannot ignore, especially with the 2026 midterm elections on the horizon.
If any Republican lawmakers negatively impact the negotiation process with Iran, Trump may encourage his supporters not to vote for them in key states during the midterms. To prevent such scenarios, a balance will likely be sought between the legislative and executive branches. At the same time, this dynamic could allow for a “good cop-bad cop” strategy to be employed between Congress and the Presidency.
This would serve to restrain any aggressive moves by Israel that might sabotage the negotiations, while also curbing any disproportionate demands from Iran.
What do US-Iran talks mean for both sides and the region?
While announcing the upcoming talks, Donald Trump said: “If the talks aren't successful, I think it's going to be a very bad day for Iran.” It not only offers insight into how the negotiations might unfold but also sheds light on the broader workings of the international system.
The U.S., heavily influenced by the Israeli lobby, has enabled a genocide in Gaza through its support and is working to neutralize all actors that might stand in the way of Netanyahu’s aggressive and expansionist policies. After years of economic sanctions failed to yield the desired outcomes, the U.S. administration, now resorting to threats of military intervention, is trying to force Iran to the negotiating table – from which it hopes to extract terms that align with Israeli interests.
In the Middle East, the U.S. has sought to preserve the monopoly on nuclear weapons exclusively in Israel’s hands. Now, it is aiming to secure a deal with Iran that surpasses the 2015 agreement signed under the Obama administration.
For the Zionist lobby, merely eliminating the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is not enough. One of the main goals of the talks is to sever all of Tehran’s connections with its proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. This is because Hezbollah and the Houthis have provided the most militarily effective resistance against Israel’s genocide in Gaza, and the Zionists want to ensure such reactions are completely prevented in the future. Just as they punished the architects of the 1973 oil embargo, they now aim to neutralize the leading opponents of the current genocide.
From Iran’s perspective, although the government in Tehran has tried to stand firm, it has been significantly weakened economically by U.S. sanctions. It does not wish to engage in direct confrontation with the world’s most powerful military force. For this reason, despite the threatening rhetoric, Iran has chosen to accept Trump’s offer to talk.
Iranian decision-makers are also aware that although Trump would prefer to focus on confronting China and does not genuinely desire a direct conflict with Iran, the Zionist lobby will do everything it can to drag the American president into such a war. Viewed from this angle, Iran’s leadership faces a serious dilemma. They must prevent the most pro-Israel president in White House history, who also prioritizes America’s economic interests and the rivalry with China, from launching a military assault on Iran at the behest of the Zionists. That is why they have accepted the offer for negotiations.
What are the main reasons behind Iran's decision to resume negotiations with the United States, and what are the potential dynamics of this process?
Iran’s positive response to Trump’s negotiations call is not a surprising development, especially considering that since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iran has sought to establish contact with the U.S. at nearly every opportunity. In the current context, Iran aims to mitigate the painful effects of sanctions, and discussions within the country suggest that a significant segment of both the civil and military bureaucracy believes tensions with the U.S. should be reduced. It is already well known that this approach resonates strongly with the public.
Therefore, since both sides appear to have the will to negotiate, the central issue under current circumstances will revolve around the format of the talks, their content, and the operation of the process itself.
Although the U.S. refers to the upcoming April 11 talks in Oman as “direct” negotiations and Iran calls them “indirect,” Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi made it clear that Iran would not get stuck on the format, emphasizing the importance of content and outcomes instead.
However, the matter of content is more complex. In a letter sent by Trump to Iran at the beginning of March, it was revealed that the topics up for negotiation would include the nuclear file, Iran’s ballistic missile program, and its regional policies.
After meeting with Netanyahu on March 7, President Trump highlighted Iran’s nuclear program as the primary negotiation topic. In this context, Trump’s rejection of Netanyahu’s proposal, reminiscent of the 2003 Libya deal, to dismantle all of Iran’s nuclear facilities in a radical manner, was perceived as a positive message sent to Tehran. The missile program, for its part, is not expected to become a major point of contention.
On another note, Iran may paradoxically use its declining influence in the Middle East – stemming from Hezbollah’s heavy losses in 2024 and the collapse of the Assad regime – as a negotiation card, arguing that its potential threat toward the U.S. and Israel has decreased.
The pace of the process is another crucial issue. Although Trump wants swift results and has stated that he would use military force “if necessary,” he is expected to allow his team time to achieve desired outcomes at the negotiation table. However, the U.S. will not let Iran set the tempo of the talks. This is because Iran is known for extracting key concessions through diplomatic contacts while deliberately slowing down negotiation processes. In this regard, Oman’s experience in mediation will be significant.
Finally, one of the key handicaps of the negotiations is that, due to the structural nature of the Iranian system, a degree of continuity is preserved within negotiation teams. For instance, many diplomats involved in the 2015 nuclear deal talks, most notably Araghchi himself, will be part of the delegation. By contrast, Trump’s team lacks experience in negotiating with Iran.
Nevertheless, the fact that both sides recognize that diplomacy can achieve outcomes that conflict cannot, indicates that we are facing a realistic negotiation process.
What is Iran's official approach to negotiations with the US? What are Iran's expectations? What are its demands and claims?
Iran's nuclear doctrine – not aimed at acquiring or developing nuclear weapons – has not changed. Therefore, there is and should not be any deadlock in diplomacy. Since the true will of Iran in nuclear activities and the alleged U.S. will are the same – a non-nuclear-weapon Iran – there is always a way to proceed.
Iran's recent communications with the U.S. have been neither symbolic nor ceremonial. There have been genuine attempts to clarify positions and open a window toward diplomacy.
Iran is ready to engage in earnest and to seal a deal. Iran and the U.S. will meet in Oman on Saturday for indirect negotiations. From an Iranian perspective, it is as much an opportunity as it is a test.
Pursuing indirect negotiations is not perversity or an ideological act but a strategic choice rooted in experience. We face a significant wall of mistrust and harbor serious doubts about the sincerity of intentions, made worse by Trump's insistence on resuming the “maximum pressure” and signing the presidential directive before any diplomatic effort.
Washington needs to understand that it was President Trump who withdrew from the JCPOA in his first term and resumed maximum pressure in his second.
Any negotiation and possible deal should be based on two major pillars:
- Assuring Iran's nuclear program's peaceful spirit and non-deviation into military dimension.
- Lifting all illegitimate sanctions against Iran rooted in ill-based allegations about Iran's nuclear intentions.
We believe that the logic and spirit of the JCPOA are still valid covering those two major pillars and can lead to a new deal.
The JCPOA contains one vital commitment that "Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons."
Ten years after the JCPOA was concluded – and nearly seven years after the United States unilaterally walked away from it – there is no evidence that Iran has violated this commitment. This has been reaffirmed by U.S. intelligence assessments time and again.
We do not over-expect nor underrate the negotiations in Muscat. We believe that if there is a genuine will, there is always a way. As recent history has shown, diplomatic engagement worked in the past and can still work.
The Muscat talks can frame the principle and the roadmap for a credible peaceful and long-lasting settlement and resolution of the problem.
Iran is willing to clarify the peaceful intent and take the necessary measures to allay any possible concerns. For its part, the U.S. can show that it is serious about diplomacy by showing that it will stick to any deal it makes. If Iran is shown respect, it will reciprocate it.
Middle East Expert
How has Israel reacted to the US-Iran talks, and what might it do?
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu mobilized the pro-Israel lobby in the U.S. during Trump’s campaign due to his harsh rhetoric toward Iran, and by refusing to agree to a cease-fire in Gaza, he played an indirect role in the Democrats’ electoral defeat.
As a result, both Israel and Netanyahu personally had high expectations from Trump regarding a potential military strike on Iran. With Trump’s return to the presidency, it was anticipated that the U.S. would take more concrete steps on Tehran, at the very least cooperating on strikes against its nuclear facilities.
However, on the evening of April 7, during a press conference with Netanyahu, Trump declared that “Iran will never possess nuclear weapons” and then announced that direct negotiations would be held on April 12. This announcement came as a shock to both Netanyahu and the Israeli public.
Reportedly, one of the four key issues Netanyahu intended to discuss during his visit to the White House was setting a date for a strike on Iran. Learning that the U.S. would instead sit at the negotiating table with Iran caused deep disappointment.
In a subsequent statement, Netanyahu said that while he and Trump agreed on the necessity of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons – potentially through a deal brokered by the U.S. – such a deal would have to be enforced by Washington, like the Libya precedent. If Iran fails to comply with the agreement, Netanyahu added, there would be no alternative left but military action.
While the Israeli government, disturbed by Trump’s stance on Iran, has chosen to remain silent, the newspaper Israel Hayom, known for its closeness to Netanyahu, criticized Trump by claiming that Iran was violating the spirit of the potential deal by transferring new weapons and long-range missiles to Shiite militias in Iraq.
Given that Israel Hayom is owned by Jewish billionaire Miriam Adelson, one of the major donors to Trump’s campaign, it is expected that pressure on him only will intensify and he will be pushed to take more concrete action against Iran.
In this context, it appears likely that pro-Israel members of Trump’s Cabinet and allies in Congress will also be mobilized to either prevent Trump from sitting at the table with Iran or, at the very least, ensure that no agreement is reached.
ORSAM Gulf Research Coordinator
What are the strategic implications of US-Iran talks for the Gulf states?
The Trump administration’s reimplementation of its “maximum pressure” policy toward Iran in 2025, following his previous term between 2017 and 2021, heightened tensions in the region. Moves by Iran-backed actors like the Houthis that destabilized military balances in the area were interpreted by the U.S. as developments for which Iran bore direct responsibility. Since October 2023, political and military tensions between both Israel and Iran and the U.S. and Iran, have become a primary concern in the security policies of Gulf countries, which lie geographically at the heart of this axis. The talks to be held between the U.S. and Iran in Oman on Saturday signal that a window for dialogue is being opened amid these heightened tensions.
In the ongoing political and military friction between the U.S. and Iran, the Gulf states are compelled to avoid openly siding with either party. During and after the signing of the JCPOA, Iran’s growing nuclear capacity and regional influence have been constant factors in shaping the Gulf countries’ security policies. While Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in his first term may have led to an expansion, and perhaps strengthening, of Iran’s nuclear strategy, developments in the region after October 2023 have contributed to the perception of Iran as a more irrational actor from the Gulf’s perspective.
Within this context, Gulf states have issued statements rejecting support for any military operation against Iran or allowing their military bases or facilities to be used for such attacks.
The upcoming U.S.-Iran talks in Oman are also supported by Gulf countries, as they represent a chance to maintain dialogue and give diplomacy an opportunity. Oman has played the role of mediator many times before, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) recently delivered Trump’s letter regarding the negotiations to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In fact, beyond Oman, countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have previously expressed their willingness to mediate in these negotiations and broader dialogues.
In this context, the Gulf states’ main expectations from the talks are to de-escalate military tensions in the region and to initiate discussions on a series of technical and political issues concerning Iran’s nuclear program.
While the process certainly contains uncertainties and risks, for the Gulf states, given their geographic location and their relations with both countries, being hopeful about dialogue between the U.S. and Iran is less a matter of choice and more a necessity.
