Russia declaring the end of the grain agreement, the Prigozhin uprising, and the post-Vilnius Summit show that it wants the cards to be reshuffled. The Prigozhin uprising exposed weaknesses and rifts in the Russian military, resulting in a loss of political reputation for Putin. It has become clear that Russia cannot achieve a clear victory on the front lines in the near future. However, the slow progress of its counteroffensive indicates that Ukraine also cannot achieve a quick resolution. This balance situation indicates that the war could potentially extend over years, unless Putin makes a sudden decision to withdraw. It is known that the Russian military faces significant manpower and logistical challenges. In this scenario where military superiority is not attainable, we observe the use of asymmetric advantages such as the cancellation of the grain agreement.
In the face of the military “stalemate” on the front lines, both sides are seeking game-changing moves and psychological victories. For example, the deployment of Wagner forces to Belarus could be aimed at expanding the front. If Zelensky had succeeded in obtaining a clear roadmap for NATO membership, it could have marked a new phase in the course of the war. The Ukrainian forces targeting the Crimean Bridge again indicate their desire to inflict a new psychological defeat on the Russian army and increase the tempo of their counteroffensive. The termination of the grain agreement by the Kremlin can be interpreted as an attempt to reduce Ukraine’s economic options and cancel its access to the Black Sea. We see that the parties struggling to make progress on the military front are trying to gain an advantage by shifting the conflict to other areas.
It can be said that Russia is seeking a new game plan after the NATO Vilnius Summit. Türkiye’s reaffirmation of support for Ukraine’s membership and the opening of the way for Sweden’s membership have clearly unsettled Moscow. Immediately after the summit, Russia’s veto of humanitarian aid to Syria and the termination of the grain agreement show its desire to raise its hand, but it should be emphasized that its hand is not very strong. Since the grain agreement was a step that enhanced Russia’s reputation among “Global South” countries, not renewing the agreement would work against Moscow’s interests. It is debatable how much the deepening humanitarian crisis in Syria serves Russia’s reputation. These steps taken by Moscow to end the grain agreement and hinder humanitarian aid to Syria in order to put Türkiye in a difficult position can initiate new negotiation processes, but they are not enough to turn the tide of the war in favor of Russia.
On the other hand, there are also those who argue that advertising these issues would be beneficial.
Those who advocate for the continuation of grain exports despite Russia’s declaration argue that grain transportation ships can be protected by a third country, and Türkiye should allow passage through the straits for this purpose. They emphasize that Russia has no right to block the ships. However, in such a scenario, there are very few countries with the naval power to protect grain ships. Furthermore, Türkiye has not allowed scenarios that would increase the risk of conflict in the Black Sea in the past. Therefore, Türkiye will seek ways to reach a new grain agreement. The Kremlin will not easily agree to a new agreement, but it will also feel the pressure from “Global South” countries. Moscow’s attempt to raise its hand by announcing the end of the grain agreement could ultimately lead to Türkiye playing a critical mediator role again.
Türkiye’s steps in the context of the Vilnius Summit were exaggeratedly interpreted as “turning towards the West.” While Türkiye’s move towards Sweden was interpreted as “turning towards the West” in response to the promises made regarding counter-terrorism efforts, EU, and the F-16 process, it should be remembered that this was done out of necessity for national interests. If negotiations with Russia are resumed, it would not be surprising to read analyses that claim Türkiye is “turning towards the East” once again. Türkiye is well aware that there are no solid alliance options such as the West or the East, so it will continue to act prioritizing national interests. If a new grain agreement is not possible despite Türkiye’s initiatives, then it becomes evident that Russia intends to make Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea impossible, even at the expense of aggravating the global food crisis. In such a scenario, tensions in the Black Sea may become inevitable.
Since the beginning of Russia’s attempted invasion of Ukraine, Türkiye has made diplomatic efforts for the conflict to end. Türkiye’s efforts, such as bringing together the Foreign Ministers of Ukraine and Russia in Istanbul, did not result in a ceasefire due to lack of support from the West and Russia’s maximalist approach. Nevertheless, Türkiye emerged as a country that can play a critical mediator role. Being one of the first countries in Europe to take action in support of Ukraine’s self-defense, Türkiye saw its national interest in bringing the conflict to an end as soon as possible. Even when a diplomatic solution was not possible, Türkiye focused on mitigating the regional and global effects of the war and achieved successes such as prisoner exchanges and the grain agreement. Since the non-renewal of the grain agreement would risk exacerbating the global food crisis, Türkiye will need to once again play a key role in the negotiations for a new grain agreement.
