Recent months have seen a flurry of diplomatic activity between Türkiye and Iraq, culminating in a significant agreement in Baghdad last week. This accord signals a mutual eagerness to close a chapter of discord and paves the way for a comprehensive consensus on a range of issues, including a unified stance against the PKK. With President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s impending visit to Baghdad, and potentially Irbil, in April, this strategic alignment not only promises a sustainable framework for bilateral ties but also portends regional ramifications.
This accord elevates Iraq to a prominent position within Turkish foreign policy, particularly in the post-May 2023 election landscape. Viewing Iraq through the dual prisms of security and economy, Ankara demonstrates its nuanced approach to new regional geopolitics.
A new phase
At the heart of the Türkiye-Iraq agreement is a shared commitment to combat terrorism, with a specific focus on the PKK and Daesh in Iraq. The PKK has been carrying out terrorist acts against Türkiye in northern Iraq for a long time, trying to become an actor in Iraqi politics and consolidating its control in regions such as Sinjar. In particular, it is trying to create a balance against Irbil by establishing close relations with Bafel Talabani, one of the important actors of Sulaymaniyah-based politics in northern Iraq. However, militarily, the PKK is in a very difficult situation in the north of Iraq. Due to Türkiye’s extensive counterterrorism operations since 2019, the PKK is having difficulty mobilizing, controlling the terrain and launching attacks against Türkiye. Despite being militarily weakened by Türkiye’s counterterrorism efforts since 2019, the PKK’s enduring presence necessitates further Turkish military expansion and local military support from Baghdad and Irbil.
On the other hand, Türkiye knows that the PKK will continue to expand its political space in northern Iraq unless it implements a comprehensive military and diplomatic move. In the long run, the expansion of its political influence could provide the PKK with more opportunities in northern Iraq and make it a key actor between Syria and Iraq due to its close relationship with the terrorist group’s Syrian wing, the YPG. For Ankara, this is considered a strategic threat. Indeed, the most concrete development reflecting this situation is the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in northern Iraq, which does not hide its relations with the PKK, as a national security issue reiterated by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. This statement stands out as one of the most concrete attitudes adopted by Ankara against the PUK in recent times and makes the PUK a legitimate target for the Turkish capital.
An additional significant motive for targeting the PKK is economic. The PKK’s activities not only challenge Iraq’s constitutional framework but also hinder strategic economic initiatives, like the Development Road Project. Within this context, Türkiye perceives the PKK, particularly its growing influence in Sinjar, as a direct threat to the success of the project.
According to the final declaration released after the meeting between Türkiye and Iraq in Baghdad last week, the strategic agreement set to be signed during Erdoğan’s visit is designed to elevate the joint effort against the PKK to a new level. The two pivotal elements of this new phase include the Iraqi government’s classification of the PKK as a banned organization and Baghdad’s enhanced involvement in collective actions against the PKK. The Baghdad government’s acknowledgment of the PKK as a “banned organization” could direct the enduring counterterrorism challenge in Türkiye-Iraq relations toward a shared strategic objective.
Conversely, the prospect of establishing a joint counterterrorism operation center between the two countries has heightened the likelihood of an extensive military campaign against the PKK. The primary objective for Türkiye and Iraq is to utterly eradicate the PKK’s presence in northern Iraq and debilitate the organization militarily. It appears that in the summer of 2024, Türkiye plans to broaden its operational scope by launching a comprehensive military offensive in northern Iraq. Consequently, this will diminish the PKK’s political influence in northern Iraq and neutralize the threat to economic projects.
Common economic interests
Beyond the security aspect, the economy serves as another critical pillar of Türkiye-Iraq relations. With Iraq being the third-largest destination for Turkish exports and Türkiye acting as a key market for Iraqi oil, a strategic agreement could greatly increase the chances of resolving their oil disputes. Furthermore, the Development Road Project offers a structural foundation for the partnership between Iraq and Türkiye.
This ambitious railway and road project, stretching from Basra to Türkiye, is poised to deliver significant economic advantages to both countries. However, the initiative encounters several challenges, especially concerning the stance of regional actors. Iran, a major regional force, has yet to take a definitive position on the project, neither endorsing nor opposing it. Similarly, the interest of other Gulf countries in the project remains limited. Incorporating northern Iraq into the project could win Irbil’s backing and mitigate potential threats to the initiative. To date, the U.S. has not expressed its support for the project. Moreover, the financial feasibility of Türkiye and Iraq covering the project’s expenses on their own seems doubtful. Thus, regional backing for the Development Road project could play a pivotal role in reshaping Ankara-Baghdad relations and the broader regional economic landscape.
Cooperation or conflict?
Türkiye is preparing for a potential U.S. withdrawal from Syria and Iraq. Particularly in Syria, Ankara is advocating for a withdrawal coordinated with Türkiye, a move that could significantly affect Turkish-American relations. This approach might also apply to Iraq. Should the U.S. change its military engagement in Iraq and Syria, Ankara’s influence in both countries could see an expansion. Ankara deems the stability of these nations to be vital for their national security and regional stability. The security environment in the region following Oct. 7 has propelled Ankara toward pursuing greater regional cooperation.
At this point, reaching a consensus between Ankara and Tehran on stability is essential. Therefore, Ankara may seek to find common ground with Tehran on strategic issues, especially counterterrorism, rather than engaging in a security competition. In Iraq, the competition between the two nations could lead to instability. However, the degree to which the Tehran administration, under U.S. pressure, is prepared to work with Türkiye remains uncertain. Consequently, it is crucial for Türkiye to follow a coordinated foreign policy approach with both Iran and Iraq.
Amid the prevailing security, economic and regional uncertainties, additional critical issues are influencing Türkiye-Iraq relations. Iraq’s water scarcity, intensified by climate change, could be alleviated through a compromise with Türkiye. Ankara acknowledges the importance of water as a key factor for stability and is willing to share water resources and aid in modernizing Iraq’s outdated water and irrigation infrastructure.
The evolving regional dynamics could herald a new era in Ankara-Baghdad relations. Achievements in Iraq may signal the onset of developments that bolster Ankara’s role in Middle Eastern politics. To achieve this strategic goal, collaboration is crucial, not just between Türkiye and Iraq but also with other regional actors.
