The US-Israeli assault launched on February 28, 2026, has profoundly shaken Iran and a wide swath of the surrounding region. While the humanitarian cost of the war remains the most pressing concern, its environmental consequences have rapidly made themselves felt on a global scale. These effects extend well beyond carbon emissions. The bombing of oil facilities and the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz have directly driven up emissions, strikes on desalination plants have endangered water security across the region, and the disruption of fertilizer supply chains carries the risk of deepening the global food crisis.
Yet the central concern of this paper is not the scale of the war’s environmental destruction but the fact that this destruction remains almost entirely invisible within the international climate regime. Emissions from armed conflicts are excluded from national reporting obligations, environmental damage in conflict zones is not systematically monitored, and the pressure of defense spending on climate finance has failed to enter the negotiating agenda. According to CCI, the first 14 days of the US/Israel-Iran war alone generated over 5 million metric tons of CO₂ equivalent emissions, a figure that exceeds Iceland’s total annual output. CEOBS reported that, as of March 10, it had identified over 300 environmentally significant incidents across the region. Yet all of this data remains virtually invisible within the existing climate negotiation framework.
COP31, scheduled for November 2026 in Antalya, presents a historic opportunity to bring this blind spot onto the agenda. The host country, Turkey, is one of the major economies closest to the conflict zone, and Australia, which holds the negotiation presidency, aims to center the conference on climate vulnerability. This paper lays out the environmental dimensions of the conflict and discusses how military emissions and conflict-driven destruction might be addressed within the COP31 process.
The Climate Cost of the US/Israel-Iran War
The climate cost of the war is striking even in its earliest data. The single largest source of emissions during the first two weeks was the destruction of buildings and infrastructure, accounting for approximately 2.4 million tons of CO₂e. This was followed by fires at oil facilities and tankers at 1.88 million tons, and fuel consumption from military operations at 529,000 tons. In addition, the embodied carbon of destroyed military equipment accounted for 172,000 tons, while missile and drone use produced 55,000 tons. The total, exceeding 5 million tons, is equivalent to the combined annual emissions of the world’s 84 lowest-emitting countries.
These figures are not unique to the conflict in Iran. The Initiative on GHG Accounting of War has calculated the four-year cumulative emissions of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at 311 million tons of CO₂e, equivalent to France’s annual emissions. A study published in One Earth found that the total carbon footprint of Israel’s assault on Gaza surpassed 33 million tons when reconstruction was included, exceeding the annual emissions of more than 100 countries. The US/Israel-Iran war is not an isolated event but the latest link in a growing pattern.
The environmental impact of the war extends beyond carbon. According to a CFR study, the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted the region’s essential food and fertilizer supply chains. Gulf states are 77 percent import-dependent for rice, 89 percent for corn, and 95 percent for soybeans, with more than 60 million people directly exposed to food shocks. Desalination plants have also been targeted. The US struck a plant on Iran’s Qeshm Island, while Iran retaliated by hitting a plant in Bahrain. With approximately 100 million people in the region dependent on desalination, the targeting of this infrastructure is opening the door to a humanitarian catastrophe.
The fertilizer question poses a direct threat to global food security. Approximately one quarter of global fertilizer production transits through the Strait of Hormuz, and combined with Houthi attacks along the Red Sea route, a significant share of global fertilizer trade is at risk. Urea prices in the Middle East rose by 19 percent within a single week. The fertilizer crisis that followed the Russia-Ukraine war pushed an additional 27 million people into poverty and 22 million more into hunger; a similar Gulf-centered disruption now risks repeating that pattern.
The Blind Spot of the Climate Regime: Military Emissions
Despite all of this environmental destruction, military emissions continue to constitute a systematic gap in the international climate regime. The origins of this gap trace back to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which excluded emissions from international military operations and military bunker fuels from national reporting obligations. IPCC reporting guidelines further compounded the problem by allowing domestic military emissions to be merged with civilian categories, effectively making disaggregation impossible. Although the Paris Agreement did not formally maintain this exemption, there is no requirement for countries to report military emissions in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).
Moreover, this gap is widening rather than narrowing. CEOBS’s 2025 data reveals that the world’s three largest military spenders—the US, China, and Russia—are no longer submitting military emissions data to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), or are submitting incomplete data. The US, in line with the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the UNFCCC, did not submit any emissions inventory report in 2025. China reported but claimed that its military emissions were “not occurring.” Together, these two countries account for half of global military spending—approximately 1.3 trillion dollars. This means that the carbon cost of half of all global military expenditure is absent from UN climate reporting.
Carbon Brief lays bare the concrete consequences of this gap. Attacks on fossil fuel infrastructure produce not only immediate emissions but also reshape long-term energy policy. During wartime, governments tend to ramp up fossil fuel production, delay renewable energy investments, and prioritize energy security over decarbonization. As UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell emphasized in March 2026, fossil fuel dependency undermines national security, and this vicious cycle is reinforced with each new conflict. Rising defense expenditure further compounds this picture by squeezing the resources available for climate action.
From COP30 to COP31: Missed and Opening Opportunities
The demand to include military emissions in climate negotiations is not new. At COP28 and COP29, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Azerbaijan presidencies launched a climate-peace declaration and the Baku Hub Initiative, respectively; however, none of these initiatives directly addressed the climate impact of conflict and military activities. At COP30, the Brazilian presidency neither placed the issue on the formal agenda nor organized a thematic peace day. Civil society, however, showed significant momentum. 88 organizations called for mandatory military emissions reporting, emissions reductions, and the protection of climate finance from defense spending. In PRIF’s words, military emissions at COP30 were “signed and sealed, but left on the dock.”
COP31 offers a unique conjuncture for taking up the agenda that COP30 left unfinished:
• First, the host country, Turkey, is one of the major economies geographically closest to the conflict zone. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is directly affecting Turkey’s energy supply chains, trade routes, and regional stability calculations. With the appointment of Samed Agirbaş, President of the Zero Waste Foundation, as the COP31 High-Level Climate Champion, Turkey has signaled its ambition to bridge climate action with civil society and business. Expanding this ambition to encompass conflict-driven environmental destruction would strengthen Turkey’s position in the international climate arena.
• Second, Australia, which holds the negotiation presidency, aims to center the conference on the climate vulnerability of Pacific island nations. A pre-COP meeting is being planned in the Pacific. The climate impact of wars is not an abstract concept for these island states; it is a tangible threat that accelerates sea-level rise and diminishes adaptation resources.
• Third, the agenda carried over from COP30 is centered on implementation. In a period when every country is expected to update its Nationally Determined Contributions with 2035 targets, questioning the military exemption in emissions reporting stands out as an appropriate agenda item in both timing and substance.
What Can Be Done at COP31?
The US/Israel-Iran war has starkly demonstrated the capacity of armed conflicts to deepen the climate crisis. Carbon emissions equivalent to the annual output of 84 countries within a two-week span, the endangerment of water security for 100 million people, and severe disruptions to global fertilizer supply chains all demonstrate that this is not merely a security or humanitarian issue but directly a climate issue.
The existing climate regime lacks the tools to reflect this reality. Military emissions failed to enter the formal agenda at COP30; however, COP31 possesses the conditions to take the first steps toward addressing this structural deficiency. Three concrete steps can be proposed:
• First, the inclusion of a dedicated discussion session on the place of military emissions in climate negotiations on the COP31 agenda. At a time when the US and China, which together account for half of global military spending, have stopped submitting data to the UNFCCC, this discussion is more urgent than ever.
• Second, the establishment of an independent international mechanism for monitoring and documenting environmental destruction in conflict zones. The methodology demonstrated by CEOBS during the war in Iran could serve as the technical foundation for such a mechanism.
• Third, the integration of the environmental consequences of armed conflicts into post-conflict recovery processes. Calculating the carbon cost of reconstruction and adopting a climate-compatible recovery framework could form the basis of this step.
Wars produce a climate impact too large to be left outside climate negotiations. The agenda “left on the dock” at COP30 could be brought to the negotiating table in Antalya. The question is no longer “Do conflicts have a climate impact?” but rather “When, and at what level, will we start taking this impact seriously?”
