On Feb. 27, 2025, PKK ringleader Abdullah Öcalan called on the group, all affiliated structures, and cadres to end the “armed struggle” and dissolve the organization. In his statement, he laid out the necessity for the PKK to lay down arms as well as the need for the terrorist group to transform into a political actor, seeking solutions within a democratic and constitutional framework that upholds Türkiye’s territorial integrity. He added that this transformation should not be limited to the PKK alone, but should be coordinated with affiliated structures in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. In doing so, Öcalan addressed the armed cadres in the Qandil Mountains, the PYD/YPG in Syria, and the political diaspora networks in Europe. Shortly after Öcalan’s announcement, the PKK on March 1 declared a unilateral cease-fire, adding that the permanence of this decision would depend on Türkiye providing a “legal framework.”
Long before this call, Türkiye’s strategy toward the PKK had evolved through three main stages. In the first stage (Counterforce), Türkiye conducted targeted military operations to reduce the PKK’s military capacity. In the second stage (Countervalue), cross-border operations focused on the economic and strategic infrastructures supporting the organization. At the current stage, Türkiye has transitioned to a "non-conventional war" paradigm, employing political, intelligence, and diplomatic tools to neutralize the PKK. Although Abdullah Öcalan’s Feb. 27 call for disarmament and dissolution may not be a direct result of this strategic shift, it aligns with the political landscape shaped by it. In other words, the timing of Öcalan’s call syncs with Türkiye’s third-phase strategy.
In the final stage so far, the PKK held its 12th congress between May 5–7 and announced its decision to disband and disarm. This critical development has been evaluated by our experts through a comprehensive and analytical lens.
Prepared by
Sibel Düz
Experts
Murat Aslan
Sibel Düz
Can Acun
Muhammed Hüseyin Mercan
Kutluhan Görücü
Hasan Kalyoncu Üniversitesi
Why did Abdullah Öcalan call for disarmament? What internal and external dynamics might explain the timing of his appeal?
The ongoing conflicts in Türkiye’s neighboring regions had long created strategic opportunities for the PKK. The power vacuums in Syria and Iraq, in particular, enabled it to maintain a regional presence. However, despite territorial advantages and external support, the PKK failed to overcome Türkiye’s counterterrorism capabilities and establish permanent "liberated zones," or sustain territorial control. On the contrary, Türkiye's political, societal, and military responses became increasingly resolute, integrated, and proactive.
The PKK's decision to shift its terror campaign to urban areas in 2015 marked a turning point for both the group and the public. The destruction and social costs inflicted by these actions led to a strong public backlash, causing a legitimacy crisis for the group. During this period, the PKK also became ideologically constrained, unable to respond to contemporary needs using its outdated Cold War-era framework. Öcalan closely observed the organization become entangled in its internal ideological contradictions and, through a quiet, long-term shuttle diplomacy, responded positively to a potential resolution process.
Therefore, the call could be analyzed through the lens of military failure, intra-organizational power struggles, and political legitimacy crises. There is a tacit but influential rivalry between the DEM Party and the PKK’s Qandil-based leadership. Post-2015, the party– having lost significant public support and political momentum – only managed to enter Parliament with the backing of far-left Turkish factions. Simultaneously, coordinated and systematic operations by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and National Intelligence Organization (MİT) weakened the PKK’s field presence and prestige. Shifting balances in Syria also worked in Türkiye’s favor, further undermining the armed struggle’s sustainability. Collectively, these dynamics made Öcalan’s reengagement a strategic necessity.
To fully grasp Öcalan’s message, it is essential to decipher the conceptual framework he employed. By critiquing real socialism and distancing himself from PKK’s historical ideological roots, Öcalan emphasized integration with Türkiye and promoted the idea of a democratic society, aiming to curb the extra-parliamentary tendencies of radical elements. His explicit message that the PKK had lost its meaning can also be read as a strategic rhetorical instrument to preempt internal resistance.
Indeed, the PKK’s latest declaration aligns with Öcalan’s call. While the organization reasserted some of its traditional ideological tenets, its reference to concepts such as “common homeland” and “equal citizenship” indicates an implicit acceptance of seeking resolution within Türkiye’s territorial integrity. Its call for the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) to play a historical role reveals an acknowledgment of existing political realities. Furthermore, the emphasis on Turkish leftist-socialist circles in the declaration reflects the group’s effort to remain relevant in the political sphere. Its vision of "Democratic Society Socialism" seeks to align with global leftist movements, resembling a revival of the Socialist International vision. Yet, a core contradiction arises here: the organization claims to transcend Marxist ideology through its critique of real socialism while remaining conceptually trapped in the Cold War lexicon.
In conclusion, the PKK emerged under the rigid ideological constraints of the Cold War, gained temporary momentum amid the political transitions of the 1990s, but has increasingly appeared outdated in the 21st century. With its aims, methods, and instruments now out of step with contemporary social, political, and technological realities, it is no longer viable for the group to continue with the ideological spirit of 1978 or the terrorist campaign logic of 1984. Recognizing this historical impasse, Öcalan called for the organization’s dissolution and the beginning of a new political era. The PKK’s response, framed as an “honorable exit,” suggests that this transformative intent is gradually being accepted both in and out of the organization.
SETA
Why did the PKK have to respond to Öcalan’s call? Was this a “compelled” organizational reflex? What role did diplomatic and military pressure play? Could some factions refuse to comply?
The PKK’s response to Abdullah Öcalan’s call for disarmament was not solely driven by a sense of loyalty to a cult of personality, but rather by strategic imperatives rooted in the instinct for organizational survival. While Öcalan still holds symbolic authority as “the historical leader and founding figure” of the group, the force of this call must be interpreted alongside the changing geopolitical and operational realities the organization faces.
The balance of power on the ground has severely shifted against the PKK. Türkiye, in recent years, has significantly enhanced its military and technological capabilities, coupled with its ability to conduct effective cross-border operations. Moreover, Ankara’s increasingly active encirclement strategy with regional actors has significantly restricted the PKK’s mobility and obstructed its ability to mount meaningful military resistance. Recent geopolitical developments – from the PKK’s shrinking regional influence and declining effectiveness of its political networks in the European diaspora to the fragile nature of its relations with the U.S. in Syria – have structurally undermined the sustainability of the terrorist organization and its acts.
In this context, the response to Öcalan’s call should be interpreted not only as a sign of ideological loyalty but also as a pragmatic reflex to ensure the organization’s survival. The PKK’s traditionally vertical and centralized structure relies on a strict hierarchical chain in its decision-making and implementation processes. It limits the ability of lower-level terrorist elements, especially local groups, regional structures, and youth factions, to act independently from the central leadership. As such, the official dissolution of the organization makes external deviation particularly costly, thereby rendering compliance with the dissolution decision effectively obligatory.
Nevertheless, the presence of semi-autonomous elements like Iran-backed armed groups, Syria-based YPG structures, and radical youth formations suggests some factions may strategically choose to remain outside the scope of the call. These factions could, at times, even be instrumentalized by the PKK itself as manipulative tools to exert pressure or signal ambiguity. In this light, Öcalan’s call and the PKK’s subsequent dissolution may reflect a sincere strategic break and a calculated repositioning effort.
Ultimately, full compliance with the dissolution decision by the PKK’s political and military bodies – which are tightly bound to the central authority – will reinforce the sustainability and internal consistency of the process.
What are the key themes in the statement released after the PKK’s 12th congress? What concepts, strategies, and positions stand out in its content?
The final declaration was released after the PKK’s 12th congress explicitly announced its structural dissolution. It states that all activities conducted under the PKK name have been terminated and that the organizational structure has been officially disbanded, following Öcalan’s February 2025 announcement. The decision is presented as being based on the assessment that the PKK has fulfilled its historical role. This step stands out as the most comprehensive act of self-dismantling ever undertaken by the organization.
The statement also clearly articulates the termination of “armed struggle.” The PKK declares that it has ended armed activities and this decision will reshape the direction of any future processes. Accordingly, the organization announced that its past strategy of armed “action” has ceased and all its operational structures tied to armed struggle will be dissolved. The statement further emphasizes that implementing these decisions is contingent on Abdullah Öcalan’s leadership in guiding the process and on the provision of legal assurances.
Another striking aspect of the text is the absence of the PKK’s former separatist rhetoric and objectives. Instead, it highlights terms such as “common homeland,” “equal citizenship,” and “democratic solution.” The statement advocates for a transition toward a peaceful and democratic political process, calling on political parties, parliament, civil society organizations, and international actors to contribute constructively. In doing so, it demonstrates the PKK’s intention to shift from armed conflict to political engagement or a grassroots-based model of social organization. This reorientation underscores the significance of the declaration as a potential turning point in the group’s trajectory.
Ankara yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi, SETA
What methodology should guide the post-dissolution and disarmament process? What Should be considered during the demobilization and reintegration phase?
With the PKK’s announcement to disband the group, various political, legal, and administrative decisions will need to be taken to ensure that the process moves forward through appropriate mechanisms. One of the most critical aspects is the deradicalization and reintegration of PKK members into society. Simultaneously, it is essential to arrange for the relocation of the so-called leadership cadre to third countries and establish the necessary diplomatic engagements to support the process. The gradual withdrawal of the organization from its controlled areas in Iraq – such as Qandil, Gara, Sinjar, Makhmur, and Asos – will require close coordination with Erbil and Baghdad. Moreover, the reopening of hundreds of northern Iraqi villages abandoned due to PKK terror activities, will require security collaboration with the KDP/Peshmerga forces.
Coordinated evacuation of terrorist elements from caves and tunnels, along with the supervised handover or destruction of weapons and ammunition under Türkiye’s oversight, are other critical elements of the process.
The PKK/KCK is an umbrella structure that encompasses many subordinate illegal formations. Dismantling all these command-and-control units, ceasing their activities, and disposing of all organizational materials, documents, and tools will also be vital. The entire demobilization process should be phased, and must not be forgotten that these steps are vulnerable to provocations.
The primary concern emerging from the PKK’s dissolution declaration is how the disarmament and liquidation phases will be managed. Establishing a joint oversight mechanism, involving all relevant security institutions will be crucial to prevent any disruption. Such a mechanism must first ensure that neither the PKK’s so-called leaders nor the members act in contradiction to the congress's resolutions. Indeed, the phrase in the dissolution declaration – “activities under the name of the PKK are terminated” – can be misinterpreted by various factions. Therefore, the demobilization roadmap must also preemptively block any attempts to resume activities under alternative names or structures.
Another key point emphasized in the congress declaration is the message directed at foreign actors. The congress delegates explicitly urged those powers who had previously supported them not to obstruct the process and to contribute constructively.
In the context of shifting political and societal dynamics in the Middle East, this call at the congress holds great importance. At this juncture, the mechanism overseeing the disarmament and liquidation phases must operate with a strategy that will also resist external manipulations. By doing so, the potential risks of the transition phase can largely be mitigated, and more concrete steps can be taken toward the reintegration of PKK members into society through the newly established mechanism.
The dissolution text's repeated references to socialism and the articulation of a vision based on “democratic society socialism” indicate that the congress members have adopted a political transition without abandoning ideological consolidation. In this respect, strict compliance with this binding decision and preventing regional affiliates from distancing themselves from the congress resolutions will be crucial to the success of the transition.
Given the historical significance of this development, all former PKK leaders, members, and supporters in political or societal spheres must exert maximum effort to align with the mechanism guiding this transition, to minimize fragility and ensure the sustainability of the process through a robust and coherent approach.
SETA
How will the PKK’s dissolution and disarmament decision resonate in the context of Syria and Iraq? How might PKK/YPG’s ties to the U.S. and its organic links with the PKK be affected? What will become of PKK's presence in key locations like Makhmur, Qandil, and Sinjar?
Following the self-dissolution by the PKK/KCK Executive Council, which has maintained its presence in the Qandil mountain range in Iraq, it is expected that all subordinate structures affiliated with this body will likewise declare dissolution and cease organizational activities. From Türkiye’s perspective, any continuation of activities in regions like Makhmur and Sinjar under different names or abbreviations will be categorically unacceptable. Moreover, the dismantling of the PKK/KCK leadership and the collapse of its command chain will render the survival of subordinate structures highly unlikely as the core power dynamics driven by the PKK vanish.
In Sinjar, elements of the YBŞ (Shingal Resistance Units) composed of local Yazidis are expected, within the framework of existing agreements between Ankara, Erbil, and Baghdad, to be either integrated into the central Iraqi government’s forces or be absorbed into KDP Peshmerga units. Similarly, the Makhmur refugee camp is also expected to be transferred under the authority of the Iraqi central government. In Iraq, the political and cultural formations affiliated with the PKK, especially Tevgera Azadi, have already been declared illegal and shut down. Other structures that remain active are likely to be closed as well, and the PKK's ability to maintain a significant presence in Iraq without armed formations appears unsustainable. One specific case worth noting is the PJAK formation operating in Iran. The PJAK may continue its activities for a while, with the outcome likely shaped by negotiations between the organization and Iranian authorities.
In the Syrian context, after the Feb. 27 declaration from Imrali calling for all PKK-affiliated groups to disarm, SDF/YPG commander Mazloum Abdi claimed that his forces are not a PKK extension and that the statement did not apply to SDF/YPG. However, the simultaneous dispatch of Öcalan’s letters to PKK structures in Europe, Qandil, and Iran—along with increased political pressure on SDF/YPG leadership – has begun to alter the group’s behavior. The toppling of the Assad regime and the establishment of a Türkiye-friendly government in Damascus would fundamentally alter the field dynamics. With Türkiye intensifying military pressure on the SDF/YPG, and as U.S. CENTCOM – gradually expected to withdraw from Syria since the Trump era – appears to be directing Mazloum Abdi toward accommodation with Damascus. Abdi has already signed an agreement aimed at integrating SDF/YPG forces into the Syrian regime.
Türkiye continues to expect full integration of SDF/YPG into the Syrian government forces under the agreement signed with Damascus on March 10. At the same time, the U.S. appears to be accelerating its withdrawal process from Syria, further pushing the SDF/YPG toward reconciliation with Damascus. Considering the post-revolution conditions faced by the SDF/YPG –military defeats, loss of political legitimacy, U.S. disengagement, and failure to secure expected support from Israel – its most rational path appears to be a political settlement with the interim government. In light of the PKK’s dissolution decision, an accelerated SDF/YPG integration process into the Syrian state can be expected.
Approximately 3,000 cadres directly affiliated with the PKK/KCK who remain in the region are likely to be disarmed. It is also plausible that areas currently held by the SDF/YPG, such as Deir el-Zour and Raqqa, will be handed over to Damascus. If the PKK leadership and command chain are fully dismantled, the pace of developments in Syria is likely to quicken. Arab elements within the SDF may be directly integrated into the central government while remaining YPG elements are expected to be downsized and incorporated under the Syrian Defense Ministry. Moreover, the handover of energy assets and the implementation of a decentralized administrative model in Kurdish-majority regions are foreseeable.
Ultimately, disbanding the PKK’s central executive structure and the dismantling of its command and centralized power elements will inevitably initiate the dissolution – whether voluntary or forced – of its other components across Iraq and Syria. Türkiye is expected to closely monitor and manage the dissolution of both the core organization and its affiliates through its political, military, and intelligence capacities in both countries.
Should the PKK’s dismantling not materialize for any reason, Türkiye will resolutely continue its military operations across Iraq and Syria. The effort to eliminate a weakened and fragmented PKK by force will persist until the process is fully completed.
