The CHP chairman publicly announced, to the applause of delegates, that he would engage in politics with the anti-Erdoğan camp in mind, not his own party, and that he would take all necessary steps to achieve this without concern for political principles or stance. The CHP's 37th Ordinary Congress concluded last weekend. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu ran virtually unopposed, but other candidates İlhan Cihaner, Aytuğ Yazıcı, and Tolga Yarman were unable to secure sufficient delegate signatures, preventing them from entering the presidential race. Under these circumstances, Kılıçdaroğlu, influenced by the March 31st local elections, had perhaps the easiest presidential race in the CHP and was elected CHP chairman for the sixth time.
The significance and significance of this congress, which the CHP portrayed to the public as "internal party democracy," was largely absent from the major power struggles it had previously seen, and where the entire process was managed by headquarters, was altered by the party leadership. This congress, held after a process entirely orchestrated by headquarters and Kılıçdaroğlu, was dubbed the "ruling congress." At the congress, where Kılıçdaroğlu claimed to elect the cadres that would carry them to power and unveiled a manifesto titled "Call to the Second Century," he delivered a speech that, aside from some new conceptualizations, was not much different from an average group meeting or a typical CHP election manifesto. However, the congress also contained some important details about the CHP and the kind of landscape it aims to create for the 2023 elections.
Kılıçdaroğlu's Friends
Perhaps the most significant part of Kılıçdaroğlu's speech at the congress was his statement, "With whom and how will we solve these problems? (...) We will solve them by coming together, we will fight together. We will do this together, together with our friends, the friends who form the Nation Alliance. We will come to power together with our friends in the upcoming elections." Throughout his speech, Kılıçdaroğlu frequently emphasized "friends" and "alliances," declaring that the CHP could not defeat the AKP and President Erdoğan on its own and needed its "friends" to achieve this. This is an admission that the CHP is incapable of coming to power. However, this announcement also clearly expresses a situation attributed to Kılıçdaroğlu, believed to have been observed for many years but feared to be voiced. This is the reality that the CHP lacks the potential and capacity to come to power and depends on other political actors to reach broad social segments.
Following the CHP's victory in a significant portion of metropolitan areas in the March 31st elections, and with various actors claiming the gains for themselves, the "Kılıçdaroğlu doctrine," articulated to highlight Kılıçdaroğlu's "strategic mind" and the lion's share of the vote, is in fact a sophisticated expression of a complete reliance on "friends." It is now a well-known fact that Kılıçdaroğlu has been trying to reach urban conservatives for many years. In other words, seeing the impossibility of the CHP reaching peripheral rural voters, he has pursued a new strategy aimed at middle-class conservatives in metropolitan areas. To achieve this, Kılıçdaroğlu himself has acknowledged the need to erode the CHP's historical ideological polarization—at least in a perceptual sense. Kılıçdaroğlu's strategy for softening this perception of his party and reaching out to different bases revolves precisely around these "friends."
Following the CHP's victory in a significant portion of the metropolitan municipalities in the March 31st elections, and with various actors claiming the gains for themselves, the "Kılıçdaroğlu doctrine," formulated to highlight Kılıçdaroğlu's "strategic mind" and his share of the vote, is in fact a sophisticated expression of a devotion to "friends." Considering Kılıçdaroğlu's failure as a umbrella candidate in 2014 as the first step in this crony strategy, the CHP has since sought to form alliances with all the different ideological factions opposed to Erdoğan, and through these alliances, it attempts to reach broader segments of society beyond its own narrow base. In doing so, it recruits prominent figures with distinct identities, adopts different rhetoric, adopts political approaches diametrically opposed to the CHP base, and discards principles long considered untouchable, all in an attempt to win votes for the anti-Erdoğan camp. The best example of this is the collaboration in the local elections between Canan Kaftancıoğlu, who is clearly distant from society's religious and traditional values, and Ekrem İmamoğlu, who recited the Quran during the election campaign. Another example is the fact that candidates from the right-wing political spectrum ran in some provinces, particularly Ankara and Antalya, and this was normalized to win. Therefore, Kılıçdaroğlu has adopted anti-Erdoğanism as his sole principle and, to achieve this, has agreed to form alliances only with all political actors and parties with whom he can agree on this principle. It is also noteworthy that similar criticisms are coming from the rather limited internal party opposition.
The CHP leader publicly declared, to the applause of the delegates, that he would engage in politics with the anti-Erdoğan camp in mind, not his party, and would take all necessary steps in this direction without concern for political principles or stance.
However, this political approach, which can be considered a strategy rather than a doctrine, has condemned the CHP and Kılıçdaroğlu to their "friends." Furthermore, it could be argued that Kılıçdaroğlu's sole strategy is to unite the anti-Erdoğan front under a single umbrella. Considering the failure of the umbrella candidate campaign in the 2014 elections and the fact that Abdullah Gül's umbrella candidacy in 2018 was not implemented due to Meral Akşener's resistance, one could argue that this strategy is not being implemented wisely. Moreover, although Kılıçdaroğlu often uses the excuse that "the party leader should not be a presidential candidate," he is aware that he is not the person who can defeat Erdoğan. Furthermore, while some consider him to be a different type of leader, it appears that he has undertaken the mission of executing this strategy as the organizer of the anti-Erdoğan front rather than a leader or president. Therefore, as Kılıçdaroğlu did not hesitate to openly state at this congress, the CHP leader publicly declared, to the applause of the delegates, that he would engage in politics with the anti-Erdoğan front in mind, not his party, and that he would take all necessary steps to achieve this by lifting restrictions on political principles and stances.
Can the CHP Succeed with Its Friends? It has long been known that Kılıçdaroğlu's primary goal in this approach is to unite the anti-Erdoğan camp under a single umbrella and contest elections with a single alliance and a single candidate. Furthermore, considering that many academics, writers, and politicians who have been caught up in the March 31st illusion have also advised Kılıçdaroğlu in this direction, it can be argued that the CHP's fundamental strategy heading into 2023 is to unite all opposition parties under a single umbrella, dubbed the "Democracy Alliance," and to field this alliance against Erdoğan with a single candidate. However, contrary to the claims of those influenced by the March 31st coup, the success of this alliance, beyond its very existence, appears highly unlikely.
It can be argued that Kılıçdaroğlu's primary goal is to force the İYİ Party to hold elections and persuade new parties and the HDP to join the alliance. In particular, Kılıçdaroğlu's positive messages toward both Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoğlu, coupled with his statements of support for the HDP, indicate that preparations for expanding the alliance have begun even before the 2023 elections. Furthermore, the emphasis on the Kurdish issue at the congress can be interpreted as a positive response to the HDP's declaration that it now wants to be a formal, rather than a covert, part of the alliance. At this point, Kılıçdaroğlu, learning from Akşener's 2018 thwarting of the CHP's "umbrella candidate Gül" plan, is now setting the rules of the game to prevent the planned rerun of a new umbrella candidate in 2023, and is now pointing the way toward the İYİ Party. The direction indicated here is to include the new parties and the HDP as saviors in the alliance and to contest the elections under a single umbrella with a single candidate.
However, when considering the existing political actors, other than the organizing CHP, the impossibility of all the İYİ Party, HDP, Felicity Party, Deva, and Gelecek parties participating in the elections under a single umbrella and fielding a single candidate to compete against Erdoğan is the most significant reason why this alliance is doomed to failure. This is because one or more of these actors are aware that appearing on the ballot in the same framework as each other would be their own political suicide. The "What the eye cannot see, the heart will endure" consolation of the implicit alliance on March 31st is not feasible for the general elections. For example, the İYİ Party's inclusion in the same framework as the HDP, or the leaders and cadres of the Deva and Gelecek parties, who seek to prove themselves and seek prominence, fading under a candidate favored by the CHP, is not a rational step, as anti-Erdoğan circles claim. Therefore, the impossibility of this alliance encompassing all its opponents and the existence of one or more actors who would be forced to be excluded from the alliance will be the primary reason for its failure.
Another reason, parallel to the first, is that in an election with at least two and a half blocs, the People's Alliance has a higher probability of winning a parliamentary majority than the opposition within the current electoral and alliance system. Under the current system, it's possible for the People's Alliance to win an absolute parliamentary majority even with a vote share around 45 percent. This suggests that even with a decline of approximately 8 percent compared to June 24th, the People's Alliance could still win a parliamentary majority. This means that even the sole goals Kılıçdaroğlu agreed on with his alliance partners, such as a new constitution and a return to a parliamentary system, will not be achieved. Furthermore, considering that the People's Alliance's total vote share across Turkey exceeded 50 percent even in the March 31st local elections, considered a major success for the opposition, it is highly doubtful that an "alliance with friends" will bring success.
Finally, even considering that the Democracy Alliance managed to challenge President Erdoğan with a single candidate, the fact remains that Erdoğan was elected president in both presidential elections with over 50 percent of the vote in the first round. In a two-and-a-half-block election, the anti-Erdoğan camp's entire strategy would be to first postpone the presidential election to a second round, and that they would operate with a "Erdoğan vs. all of us" strategy in the second round. However, even the second round is doubtful. If the opposition succeeds in this, the second round will turn into a choice between Erdoğan and his opponents, and the fact that voters have favored Erdoğan in all similar elections has been proven repeatedly over the past eighteen years. Furthermore, considering that Erdoğan, who will likely enter the second round in two weeks as the candidate of an alliance that has already won a parliamentary majority, will likely be the likely winner, and voters will likely consider this, it is clear that the CHP and its allies are unlikely to succeed despite all this.
Therefore, it is clear that the recently circulated "Kılıçdaroğlu doctrine" and the "Democracy Alliance," portrayed as the only solution by many CHP advisors, are, contrary to popular belief, a manifestation of the CHP's inability to govern alone. Furthermore, it can be argued that the influence of the CHP's March 31st victory in Istanbul and Ankara continues to linger. It would be more beneficial for the CHP and its guiding forces to rid themselves of this influence and seek reasonable and realistic paths to defeat Erdoğan.
