In September 2025, the war in Ukraine extended into NATO territory when Russian drones violated both Poland's and Romania’s airspace. The most serious incident occurred on the night of Sept. 9-10, when between 19 and 23 drones crossed from Belarus into Polish airspace. Polish and allied aircraft, including F-16s and Dutch F-35s, intercepted and shot down several drones, while others crashed in rural areas, damaging homes and vehicles without causing human casualties. The incident was described by Warsaw as a “deliberate provocation,” while Moscow insisted that the drones had been aimed at Ukraine and that any infringement of NATO airspace was unintentional.
Almost simultaneously, Romania reported that at least one Russian drone had briefly penetrated its airspace near the Black Sea. The Romanian Defense Ministry denounced the incursion as an irresponsible act and scrambled F-16s to monitor the situation, though the drone caused no damage. Collectively, these events marked the first time NATO aircraft had directly engaged and destroyed Russian drones inside the NATO airspace since the outbreak of the Ukraine war in 2022.
In response, Poland invoked Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, triggering emergency consultations among the allies. Operation Eastern Sentry was launched on Sept. 12 to reinforce the alliance’s eastern flank with the deployment of additional fighter jets, air defense systems, and rapid-response coordination. European governments strongly condemned Russia’s actions; in contrast, the United States under the Trump administration issued inconsistent signals: initial strong language on social media was followed by a more cautious official stance.
While the alliance demonstrated readiness by intercepting drones and reinforcing defenses, questions remain about Washington’s reliability and about how far Russia might go in probing NATO’s cohesion. With the large-scale Russian-Belarusian Zapad 2025 exercise looming, the September incursions were widely seen as a warning that further provocations could follow, placing NATO under severe pressure to balance deterrence with the avoidance of escalation.
Distinguished analysts and experts were consulted to evaluate the episode from a range of vantage points. The following presents their nuanced analyses and reflections.
Prepared by Sibel Düz, SETA Researcher
Can Kasapoğlu, Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute
To what extent was Russia’s use of drones over Polish and Romanian airspace a deliberate provocation to test NATO’s red lines, or was it more about probing NATO’s political unity ahead of Zapad-2025? And how should we interpret Moscow’s messaging in this context?
The recent incident is best understood as a probing operation, not a provocation. International media often mischaracterized it, but radar imagery shows drones flying linear, pre-programmed trajectories into Polish airspace rather than the erratic deviations usually caused by electronic warfare. This demonstrates deliberate planning and execution, consistent with a coordinated strike package rather than accidental overflight.
The aim of this probing was not to test NATO’s political resilience; that has already been demonstrated through the alliance’s unified response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Instead, the operation targeted NATO’s Concept of Employment (CONEMP) and, more broadly, its Concept of Operations (CONOP). Russia used the event to examine how systems and capabilities are actually employed under combat conditions, reaction timelines, decision protocols, and interoperability across multiple national assets.
Open-source information and NATO statements confirm the involvement of Italian AWACS, Dutch F-35s and F-16s, German Patriot batteries in Poland, and aerial refueling aircraft. By observing their responses, Russia could evaluate several factors:
- The scramble time and procedures for Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) aircraft,
- The speed and scale of NATO’s force integration once the airspace was violated,
- AWACS performance in detecting, filtering, and queuing sensor data across datalinks,
- Effectiveness of aerial refueling protocols during interception operations,
- The operational role of Patriot systems, whether active or limited to radar coverage,
- Comparative performance between NATO forces in Poland and the Ukrainian Air Force.
In practice, the incursion functioned as a live-fire stress test. While interceptions were expected, given Ukraine’s consistently high interception rates, the true value for Russia lay in the cumulative dataset: detailed records of NATO’s timing, procedural protocols, and cross-platform coordination. This operational intelligence is strategically significant, particularly in the context of the Zapad-2025 exercise, which has emphasized drone-intensive warfare. The Polish incident, therefore, simultaneously provided Russia with operational data and validated its own preparations for high-intensity, drone-centric warfare on NATO’s eastern flank.
It is important to distinguish this event from earlier drone incursions in Romania and the Baltic states. Those were plausibly explained by Ukrainian electronic warfare diverting flight paths. In contrast, the Polish case was a deliberate strike package that maintained a consistent trajectory, revealing both Russia’s intent and its focus on probing NATO’s defensive architecture.
Rıfat Öncel, SETA Researcher
How do the mixed signals from the Trump administration affect NATO’s collective deterrence posture, and could this undermine European allies’ trust in U.S. security guarantees? And could perceived U.S. hesitancy embolden Russia to test NATO further?
The United States’ response to Russian drone incursions into Poland was underwhelming, and it certainly caused further frustration in Europe. Trump’s statement after the incident reads that “what’s with Russia violating Poland’s airspace with drones? Here we go!” means nothing and indicates his inability to develop a cohesive policy against Russia yet. More worrisome, Trump later commented that the incident “could have been a mistake,” which, seemingly, and rightly caused significant disappointment in Poland. Polish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister responded rapidly, saying unequivocally that it was not a mistake. What’s more important here is the fact that whether the incursion was a mistake or not, the given response is a demonstration of resolve because the incident – whether intended or not – is a test of resolve. And resolve signaling is a very important component of the credibility of deterrence.
It is widely known that there’s a significant gap in the perspectives between the United States and Europe toward the war in Ukraine. And this was understandable given Ukraine’s diminishing capabilities, Russia’s increasing manpower and defense-industrial output, as well as Europe’s decades of failure in shouldering sufficient burden within NATO. However, the unimpressive response of the Trump Administration risks significantly eroding trust in American security guarantees. What we are seeing now is a silent but widespread frustration in senior European officials, dissatisfied with how Trump is handling the incident. Responding to a question, a White House official reportedly argued that Trump only wants to end this war and that the war was the result of Biden’s incompetence. However, these statements after such an incident only weaken Trump’s hand as they demonstrate the U.S.' unwillingness to confront Russia.
If Trump wants to end the war, he should have developed a forceful response to such an incursion. Furthermore, the Trump Administration has long celebrated its bold leadership based on the slogan peace through strength. Such assertive policy was implemented elsewhere, as in the European military spending, the Ukraine minerals deal, and the latest Iranian crisis, but remained elusive toward Russia, far from being impressive. The circumstances, now, naturally risk eroding NATO’s collective deterrence and confidence in U.S. security guarantees in Europe. Furthermore, it may significantly embolden Russia to continue such acts. The evolution of a single incursion into frequent violations is likely to cause irreversible harm to NATO’s deterrence.
Murat Aslan, Associate Professor at Hasan Kalyoncu University & SETA Researcher
Given that this was the first time NATO aircraft directly engaged Russian drones, what scenarios might push the alliance from Article 4 consultations to invoking Article 5, and how prepared is NATO for such an escalation? And how should rules of engagement evolve to balance deterrence with escalation control? What diplomatic backchannels exist to prevent unintended escalation between NATO and Russia?
The Russian UAVs, detected first in Poland and then in Romania, must be assessed in two separate areas: political and military. In the political context, Russia is sending a message to the European continent, especially Eastern European countries, with a slight smile, saying, "I hold the strings." It is a kind of implication that "we are close to you," together with Belarus. In this way, a tragicomic warning is being issued to NATO and the EU member countries, whose relations with the U.S. are experiencing ups and downs. Indeed, while sending a message of solidarity against Russian violations, Trump criticizes them for "not fully implementing the oil embargo," thereby justifying Russia. Therefore, Russia's airspace violations test NATO and the EU's resolve and capabilities. The fact that missiles worth $100,000 are being used against drones costing $10,000, and that jets are searching for drones in the air, highlights the military aspect of the incident.
Airspace violations are generally carried out for two different purposes. Reconnaissance and surveillance are usually the primary objectives. In this context, attempts were made to detect the deployments and order of battle of opposing countries. This objective requires the use of tactical drones that cannot be detected by radar. It is known that 16 violations in Poland were carried out by the UAVs launched from Belarusian territory and visible to Polish radars. These UAVs, which were circulated in the press, appear to be equipped with jet engines and designed for speed with aerodynamics. Additionally, the payload on the underside of the platform is not clearly visible.
Although technical intelligence reports have not yet been shared with the public, it appears that Russian UAVs are derivatives of Iran's Shahed loitering munitions, known as Gerbera. These UAVs can be used against radars or critical facilities with a search head for radars and munitions to hit them as a payload. However, given that no findings related to payload have been reported, Russian UAVs may have been used to test air defenses, command and control, and response systems.
In this context, the military purpose of Russian UAVs launched from catapults or specially designed carriers (such as trucks or lorries) is to recce "the adversary." With the downing of the UAVs, the Russians were able to monitor which radars were operational, how many aircraft of which type took off from which runway, and which unit reported to whom. In other words, an X-ray study was conducted on the current state of Poland and NATO's force structure, capacity, and capabilities.
On the other hand, remaining unresponsive to such a violation is not an option for Poland. It must take measures in line with the degree of “confidentiality discipline” for possible violations. In this context, scenarios for how to respond cost-effectively to any violation should have been laid out for probable “situations.” However, political panic and military retaliation scenarios that go beyond what is necessary show that these scenarios have not been well thought out.
Arda Mevlütoğlu, Independent Defense Analyst
What adjustments should NATO make in its air defense and rapid response mechanisms on the eastern flank to prevent future drone incursions? Should NATO consider permanently stationing additional air defense assets in Poland and the Baltic?
In September 2025, 19 Russian drones violated the Polish airspace, and only a handful were shot down. This incursion, a Kremlin probe, exposed gaps in low-altitude air defense. NATO scrambled fighters and launched Operation Eastern Sentry, deploying extra jets to bolster air defenses across the eastern flank.
NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) concept calls for an integrated Allied air defense network. A stronger Federated Mission Networking approach is needed to ensure instant cross-border queueing. The drone incident showed the need to plug low-altitude gaps by adding counter-UAS capabilities. To prevent future incursions, NATO should close these gaps. Key steps include deploying additional early warning sensors, including radars and electronic intelligence systems, as well as air defense weapon systems such as advanced SAM batteries, anti-aircraft artillery, and counterdrone systems to Poland and the Baltics for continuous coverage. The deployment of these systems should be based on permanent rotation plans.
To mitigate risks resulting from a lack of comprehensive early warning capabilities, the deployment of more low-altitude surveillance radars across Poland and the Baltic should be considered.
These radars, which would be integrated into NATO’s Air Command and Control System (ACCS), can be supported by civilian air traffic radars and passive RF sensors to create a denser detection mesh. Secondly, to enable faster engagement rules, NATO should delegate shoot-down authority to local air defense commanders (rather than waiting for higher-level approval), which would allow allied air defense to neutralize drones before deep penetration.
To further improve deterrence and defensive posture, NATO should permanently reinforce its eastern flank air defenses by stationing more assets in Poland and the Baltic, paired with faster response protocols. A persistent, layered defense posture, combined with regular drills and clear engagement rules, will reassure allies and signal Moscow that any drone incursion will meet a swift, unified response.
Lastly, it should be underlined that Türkiye is well capable of providing systems and solutions to all requirement items listed above, based on its experience in the design, development, and production of key components of the Çelik Kubbe (Steel Dome) multi-layered air defense system-of-systems, such as ALP early warning radars, Hisar and Siper air defense missile systems, electronic warfare and C4ISR systems.
Büşra Zeynep Özdemir, SETA Researcher
Beyond military measures, how effective can sanctions and energy diversification policies be in deterring Moscow from escalating cyber-kinetic hybrid attacks on NATO territory?
Actually, it is clear that they are not as effective as expected. One can easily release this by looking at the EU’s imports of Russian energy from the beginning of the Ukraine war. Right after the invasion, as we know, the EU, the U.S., and some of their allies decided to impose sanctions on Russian energy products. Coal was the first commodity the EU targeted. At the time, the bloc imported almost 50% of its hard coal from Russia. Although the share decreased by about 98% since the beginning of the war, it has yet to reach zero, totaling more than $10 billion even in 2024.
Oil is the second commodity on which the EU began to impose sanctions. It prohibited the import of crude oil in December 2022 and refined petroleum products in February 2023, but only those imported as seaborne. Nevertheless, even though Brussels only allowed pipe oil imports, European buyers continued to import Russian oil by using “shadow” vessels. Embargoed oil was transferred by rerouting the tankers.
Natural gas imports and nuclear energy are still not listed among sanctioned Russian energy products by both the EU and the U.S. European countries continue to import natural gas via TurkStream, and in the form of LNG. The United States imports more than 20% of its enriched uranium and plutonium from Russia, which accounted for around $624 million in 2024, slightly down from $646 million in 2021.
Russia has earned over 1.110 billion euros from its fossil fuel exports since the beginning of the war. And the amount the EU’s paying for Russian energy, totaling 21.9 billion euros, is still more than they provide as financial aid to Ukraine (18.7 billion euros). Any further sanctions can be imposed on Russian energy, but buyers in both the EU and the U.S. will still require what Moscow exports as long as it is cheaper and of better quality.
