When the pre-COP31 ministerial meeting opened in Nadi, Fiji, on 5 October, the host called on developed countries to support just transition and to provide finance to the countries hit hardest by climate change. Lynda Tabuya, Fiji’s Minister for Information, Environment and Climate Change, asked countries to commit climate finance and project support for a just transition away from fossil fuels. The call summed up one of the main items on the agenda of COP31, which meets in Antalya in November. Tackling climate change means transforming many sectors, from coal mines to thermal power plants and carbon-intensive factories. Just transition is the name of the approach that aims to keep the cost of this transformation from falling on workers, on particular regions and on the poor.
In the international negotiations the concept has two dimensions. The domestic dimension concerns the protection of workers at risk of losing their jobs and of regions whose economies depend on a single sector. The international dimension arises from the gap in means between countries. In the words of the COP30 decision adopted in Belém, developing country Parties may lack the institutional and financial capacity to achieve just transitions on their own. In November 2025 in Belém, Parties decided to develop a mechanism for just transition. In its executive report of March 2026, the COP30 Presidency counts the creation of the mechanism among the conference’s key achievements. Civil society organizations even gave the mechanism a name that runs from Belém to Antalya. The timetable was also set. A draft decision on the process for putting the mechanism into operation was to be prepared at the June 2026 session in Bonn and adopted in Antalya in November.
That is not what happened in Bonn. Negotiators barely got started on the mechanism. According to a representative of the Climate Action Network (CAN), one week of the ten-day session went to procedural disputes rather than to the mechanism itself. The note prepared by the two co-chairs of the negotiating group was not accepted as the basis for negotiation either. Drafting the text was left to the November talks.
Türkiye holds the COP31 Presidency. Under the partnership arrangement between Türkiye and Australia, the negotiations are led on Australia’s behalf by Chris Bowen as President of Negotiations. In the joint letter they sent to Parties ahead of the Fiji meeting, COP31 President Murat Kurum and Bowen set the bar high. The letter aims for agreement in Antalya on both the mechanism’s functions and its governance and modalities. Kurum describes COP31 as an “Implementation COP”. The just transition mechanism is one of the places where this claim will be tested. This piece looks at what is to be decided on just transition in Antalya, at what divides countries, and at the tools in the host’s hands. If the goal in the joint letter is reached, Antalya will have scored a major success. Given the divisions between countries, however, the minimum measure of success should be set more realistically. That measure is a decision that clarifies what the mechanism will do and on what timeline it will be set up.
A Decision in Belém, but No Shape
Just transition has been a separate item in the climate negotiations since 2022. That year, in Sharm el-Sheikh, Parties established a work programme on just transition. The programme runs as a dialogue process in which countries meet at least twice a year to discuss their just transition experiences. In Belém, Parties decided to develop a mechanism in addition to this process. The decision defines the purpose of the mechanism as enhancing international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building and knowledge-sharing, and enabling equitable, inclusive just transitions. But the decision does not turn this purpose into concrete functions. What kind of structure the mechanism will have, who will govern it and how it will be financed are also left open.
The most sensitive issue is finance. The Belém decision did not write finance into the sentence that states the mechanism’s purpose. Finance language appears in separate paragraphs of the decision, without being tied to the mechanism. Behind this lies a split between country groups. Developing countries have said since at least 2023 that, under heavy debt, they need grants and low-cost finance for just transition. Many developed countries, for their part, have argued since the mechanism proposal came to the table that a new structure would duplicate existing institutions and add to the burden on the UN system. Put roughly, for one side the issue is avoiding a new financial obligation, for the other it is access to the resources that would make the transformation possible.
Two decisions are expected on this item in Antalya. The first concerns the route and the timeline by which the mechanism will be put into operation. The Belém decision asks Antalya to agree on this process, not to establish the mechanism. The second is an assessment of whether the work programme set up in 2022 has worked, and a decision on whether it will continue. The two decisions are linked. Whether the mechanism will be part of this dialogue process or be set up as a separate body is also contested. The question looks technical, but at bottom it is about whether the mechanism will be a platform for discussion or a structure that gives countries concrete support. One of the options compiled in the co-chairs’ note is a phased timeline. Under it, the design would be concluded with a decision in 2026, the institutional structure would be built in 2027, and implementation would be scaled up in 2028-2030. The note has no formal status. Even so, this timeline and the language of the Belém decision suggest that Antalya will be a starting point for the mechanism rather than a destination.
The Divide on the Table: Knowledge Platform or Implementation Tool?
The discussions in Bonn showed how deep this divide runs. The EU, the United Kingdom, Norway and Japan see the mechanism mainly as a platform for sharing knowledge and tools, built on existing institutions rather than on a new structure. The UK went a step further. It said that proposals on finance and means of implementation went far beyond what could be achieved in this process, and that there was no mandate for a fund or a funding window. Citing budget constraints, it also opposed the creation of a new body or a new finance mechanism. The African Group, the Like-Minded Developing Countries (for whom Saudi Arabia spoke) and India want the mechanism to mobilize finance, technology and capacity-building support. The African Group asks for this support to come through grants and non-debt instruments, and for the mechanism to be set up as a separate body with two tiers, one providing policy guidance and the other technical support.
The second divide concerns scope. At its core is the question of whether just transition is mainly about cutting emissions, or about development, food security and adaptation to climate change. In Bonn this question took concrete form around agriculture. The EU wanted the just transition discussion to give more room to emission reductions and to transitioning away from fossil fuels. The UK argued for a reference to emissions from agriculture and for carrying into this process the outcome of the global stocktake, which in Dubai in 2023 called for transitioning away from fossil fuels. The group for which Saudi Arabia spoke found mitigation-centred approaches and the import of the global stocktake into this process unacceptable, and called the latter top-down. India, for its part, described the way agriculture was handled as a red line. In India’s view, the priority in a sector dominated by smallholders is adaptation and resilience, not emission reductions. Behind these objections one can read a concern that just transition will cease to be a support tool and turn into a new source of mitigation pressure.
The third divide is trade. Speaking for developing countries, the G77 and China brought into the just transition discussion the argument that unilateral trade measures justified on climate grounds, such as the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, place an additional burden on them. The EU maintains that these are climate measures, not trade measures. The UK also holds that trade is not the subject of this agenda item. Belém had envisaged a separate dialogue on trade, but Bonn showed that this separation did not hold at the just transition table.
The COP31 Presidency’s Goal and Tools
Kurum and Bowen have kept just transition on the negotiating agenda since their first joint letter. The first letter listed just transition, together with agriculture and transparency, among the cross-cutting areas. It also counted “the development of the Just Transition Mechanism to promote orderly and inclusive transitions that leave no one behind” among the mandates, dialogues and initiatives the presidency would draw on. The second joint letter, sent ahead of the Fiji meeting, made the goal concrete. It calls for agreement in Antalya on both the mechanism’s functions and its governance and modalities. This is a broader goal than what the Belém decision asks of Antalya. The same letter announced that ministerial pairs would be appointed early for just transition, alongside climate finance, mitigation and adaptation. These pairs will consult with Parties and report possible areas of consensus to Kurum and Bowen. The agenda of the informal just transition workshop that Australia hosted in Sydney from 30 September to 2 October also closed with the question of which elements of the mechanism need to be decided in Antalya.
Under the partnership arrangement, the COP31 Presidency rests with Türkiye. Running the negotiations and preparing the draft texts is the responsibility of the President of Negotiations, a role Australia has taken on. Türkiye runs the hosting, the Leaders’ Summit on 11-12 November, communications on the conference, and the Action Agenda, which makes up the conference’s agenda outside the negotiations. As Bowen announced at the Fiji meeting, the two countries have also agreed on a cover decision to be prepared under the presidency’s leadership. Just transition does not appear as a separate theme among the ten priority themes of the Action Agenda. It appears instead in the stated goals of existing themes. The forums convened on skills and capacity-building, for example, have as their stated goal “a just, inclusive and climate-resilient transition”. In this division of labour, the host’s influence on just transition will take shape through the tools it runs itself rather than through the draft texts.
Three Proposals for Antalya
The first proposal is to define success on two levels. Full success would be agreement on both the functions and the governance of the mechanism, as the joint letter aims for. The minimum threshold is clarity on the purpose and functions of the mechanism, on its relationship to the existing dialogue process, and on the timeline for setting it up. The details of institutional operation can be left to the following year. C2ES, a Washington-based think tank, also presents as one option deciding the main components at COP31 and the details by COP32 in 2027. This approach may not satisfy developing countries, which expect the mechanism to become operational at COP31, or civil society, which wants it established in Antalya. Yet agreeing on how to govern a mechanism whose job is unclear will be even harder.
The second proposal is to discuss finance in terms of functions. If the debate gets stuck on whether or not a fund will be created, agreement becomes harder. There are middle paths among the options on the table. One is to ease access to the technical and financial support available in existing UN climate bodies and to match that support with the countries requesting it. Another is to provide guidance on just transition to development banks and international financial institutions. These functions bring access to finance onto the mechanism’s agenda without creating a new fund. The host has an example of this logic in hand. The Climate Implementation Bridge (BRIDGE) in Türkiye’s Action Agenda is, in the words of the joint letter, not a new climate fund. It is designed to connect country-owned climate priorities and concrete project pipelines with sources of finance, technical expertise and implementation partners. In the consultations of the ministerial pair to be appointed for just transition, this experience can give the two sides common ground on which to talk.
The third proposal is for the host to use its own space. Although just transition is not a separate theme in the Action Agenda, the Thematic Days to be held in Antalya alongside the negotiations are a suitable setting for countries to share their just transition experiences. In fact, the programme already lists just transition among the sub-topics of the Human and Social Development day on 18 November. The Sydney workshop set aside a session for Australia’s own experience. In Antalya a similar space could be opened to countries from different regions. Giving just transition a place at the Leaders’ Summit could also lend political support to the ministerial pair’s consultations. This setting also gives the host a chance to present its own preparations. The National Just Transition Strategy, prepared under the coordination of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, could be a concrete example for Türkiye to share in Antalya.
Conclusion
Antalya will pass its just transition test not by settling every detail of the mechanism, but by clarifying what it will do and on what timeline it will be set up. The goal in the joint letter goes beyond this. If that goal is reached, the legacy of Belém will have taken concrete shape. An outcome that falls short of the minimum threshold would leave the mechanism to another year of procedural disputes and weaken COP31’s implementation claim. The host’s just transition table, meanwhile, is not set only in the negotiating room. Türkiye has defined just transition in its Climate Law and aims to complete its national strategy before COP31.
