“Strategic faults cannot be fixed by tactical moves”
The current situation in Iran and the Middle East requires an assessment of the U.S.-Israel war and all the parties involved. To understand the developments, it is best to first outline the current circumstances and then lay out a vision for the next phase. In this context, an evaluation of the military and political positions of the U.S. and Israel will be examined first, followed by an analysis of the Gulf countries' stances, and finally Iran’s.
The U.S. and Israel:
The U.S. and Israel have militarily targeted pre-identified strategic sites in an effort to bring about regime change in Iran and eliminate the long-term threat to Israel. Therefore, the initial wave of the phased military operation can be based on the following:
- A military campaign that creates chaos in Iran while ensuring there is no significant military response,
- As the intensity of the military offensive grows, keeping the initiative for nonmilitary ground actions with the U.S. and Israel,
- Destroying Iran’s military capacity to secure air superiority and naval control, enabling reach into Iranian territory,
- Provoking the Iranian people to stage a coup against their government through political narratives advanced by both Trump and Netanyahu,
- In the worst-case scenario, if the regime does not change, aiming for politicians sympathetic to the U.S. and Israel take over the government.
To this end, the initial targets were the political and military leadership, command-and-control systems, and military facilities. However, the U.S. and Israel have not achieved the goals of selecting a new leader and overthrowing the regime through a popular movement so far. In the new phase of the operation, civilian infrastructure has been targeted, including energy facilities.
According to Trump, one factor the U.S. overlooked was Iran's ability to strike Gulf countries. Currently, the U.S. is trying to destroy mobile targets with rockets, which could be aimed at Gulf countries, using its air force and drones to ease the worries of its Gulf allies. Therefore, the U.S. Central Command is focusing on targeting mobile trucks and lorries on Iranian roads. The goal is to reassure the Gulf countries.
The next phase of the operation might involve increasing public pressure on the Iranian regime. In the effort to eliminate military capabilities, this phase could include strategic airstrikes targeting Iran's infrastructure. This would prevent Iran from retaliating in subsequent military phases. Transportation, energy lines, and the telecommunications network would be the first targets, leading to a process of attrition that could paralyze daily life and incite the population against the regime.
In the military context, it is clear that the U.S. aims to shape the environment for greater military and political action. Nevertheless, military actions across Iran fall short of influencing internal voices. The American public is increasingly voicing concerns over the most powerful country on Earth being seen as an Israeli proxy. As the war continues, protests against immigration enforcement (ICE) could escalate into anti-war demonstrations, like those during the Vietnam War. If inflation spirals out of control, anti-Israel sentiment might gain significant support among low-income citizens. In this situation, Trump may seek to slow the pace before the November elections. Losing the Senate majority in those elections would threaten impeachment, posing a serious risk for Trump. From this perspective, it can be argued that American military strength has actually become the weakest link in U.S. politics.
Israel continues to hold an advantage with the F-35 fighter jets and American ammunition in a military sense. Just like the jets Israel received as American aid during the 1967 war made an impact, stealth aircraft now help establish military dominance in the Middle East. However, military revisionism usually reveals truths rather than illusions, and instead of reshaping the Middle East, the region we face might be different. Developments in the Gulf countries also point to this reality.
Gulf Countries
The Gulf countries are still dealing with trauma. Their oil-based economies, which thrived thanks to U.S. security guarantees, also pose risks for their regimes. The U.S. has sacrificed the stability of these oases on the desert’s edge for Israel’s security by launching a military operation against Iran without consulting them. More importantly, during the crisis, the U.S. removed its military bases established for deployment instead of converting and repositioning them for wartime use. While Gulf states counter Iranian missiles with their own capabilities, they still are not discussing political and military strategies or scenarios for the postwar period. Nonetheless, we should wait until the war ends.
It must be acknowledged that the long-term effects of the trauma in the Gulf have led to distrust of the U.S. military presence, and these countries now aim to establish autonomous defense systems. Israel’s concern is that Iran poses a threat, but it should also be considered that, in the future, the Gulf could exclude the U.S. and Israel and form a military alliance. Consequently, reviving previously discussed projects like an Arab NATO, which would include all Muslim countries, could prompt Israel to adopt a different stance.
Ultimately, it is clear that the money Gulf countries have paid the U.S. for security over the past decades has been wasted. For this reason, the current instability might also change U.S. priorities in the fight against Iran. Meanwhile, Muslim countries with developed defense industries and diversified economies, such as Türkiye, Malaysia, and Indonesia, will present new opportunities for cooperation from the Gulf’s perspective. Alongside developments in the Gulf, the U.S. and Israel have begun to incite a possible ethnic division in Iran in the second phase of the war. Although Trump made a statement, not interested in the Kurds, it is evident that this rhetoric stems from intellectual confusion. Therefore, it would be useful to examine whether ethnic diversity is a sensitive issue in Iran.
The Possibility of Ethnic Uprising in Iran
To support military operations, U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies continue their divisive and destructive efforts persistently. In this context, attempts to incite ethnic groups and establish autonomous regions – as seen in Syria – could escalate in Iran. The U.S. and Israel aim to create a new situation in Iran through ethnic-based division, similar to the de facto split that has persisted in Syria for the past decade. The goal is to weaken the regime and replicate a fate similar to that of Bashar al-Assad but in Iran.
If regime change through this method fails, the plan is to push for ethnic fragmentation of the country. Such a strategy would distract the Revolutionary Guards and prevent them from focusing their forces in key areas. Given the chaos this approach could generate, it's important to focus on the main ethnic groups. The Iranian Kurds, favored by Israel and the U.S., will be addressed first.
Kurds
Kurdish groups came into focus last week. It's impossible to separate these groups into camps like Iraq and Iran because the Kurds in both countries are connected through tribes. It's unlikely that the KDP in Iraq would try such a move. The PUK has previously tried to keep close ties with both the U.S. and Iran. Therefore, the Talabani brothers may support the U.S. and Israel without drawing attention and betraying their Iranian allies. Past experiences and cost-benefit analyses suggest that the PKK might prefer to remain in the background, as the PUK does. In fact, PJAK, PKK’s Iranian branch, has joined the new Iranian Kurdish Political Coalition. However, Iranian Kurdish groups in Iraq and Iran are in a different position.
With support from the PUK and PKK, Iranian Kurdish groups, following the example of the PYD-YPG, have established the Iranian Kurdistan Political Forces Coalition, which includes the KDPI, PJAK, PAK, Khabat, and Komala. With the physical backing of the PUK and PKK, it seems likely that these groups will serve Israeli and U.S. interests under new names and symbols. However, the stability of this alliance remains uncertain due to the non-participation of two Iranian Kurdish groups. Given the tribal-based structure of Iranian Kurds, unpredictable alliances and groups playing double roles may continue to emerge in the coming period.
Balochis
When the public discusses the Kurds, other ethnic groups' mobilization must also be considered. Currently, the Balochis are the strongest group. With around 3 million people, Sunni Balochis in the Sistan and Balochistan province control the area along Iran's Gulf of Oman coast, from the Pakistani border to the Strait of Hormuz. From an American naval security perspective toward Iran, the Balochis should be provoked.
The Balochis have a strong social structure organized into tribes. While the tribes are named Rigi, Naroi, Bameri, Shahbakish, and Barakzai, it is important to note that they have their own social contracts among themselves. Tribes can arm their members without distinction between military and civilian personnel, alongside armed groups. It should be noted that Baluchi armed groups are divided into three factions and have a limited number of armed members. In this context, Jaysh al-Adl and Ensar el Furkan, which emerged after the disbandment of Jundallah, have a small number of militants (around 1,000-1,500 in total) in Iran. The Balochistan Liberation Front, on the other hand, operates in Pakistan. The mobilization of the Balochis, who have a strong tribal structure, is also becoming a significant problem for Pakistan. A new process involving Pakistan may develop following a rapid increase in the number of armed Balochis.
The Revolutionary Guards already keep around 10,000 soldiers and special forces in this region to control the Balochis, forming a strong Basij force. Therefore, the Balochis’ dream of independence, instigated by the U.S. and Israel, will likely face a harsh response, and the U.S. will try to support these groups with its special forces and air force.
South Azerbaijanis
The third option in the ethnic conflict scenarios is the south Azerbaijanis, whose different dynamics need to be addressed too. While the sectarian similarity between the South Azerbaijanis and the Persians is an important factor, it has been observed that national consciousness manifests in “stadium chants.” In other words, with a population of 20-25 million, south Azerbaijanis are an ethnic group that is aware of its ethnic identity, speaks the same language, and will be the group most affected by instability in Iran.
Political movements reached their peak in 1945 with the Azerbaijan People's Government, but the Iranians dissolved this government in 1946. The sense of Azerbaijani identity, which grew through culture, language, and sports, has sometimes been overshadowed by Shiite identity. In fact, it is known that the Khamenei and P hərkeșian families are also Azerbaijani.
Following the recent actions by the U.S. and Israel, if the situation in Iran descends into chaos, Azerbaijanis might face significant challenges in ensuring their own security. In fact, south Azerbaijan does not have an armed force. Therefore, they are openly expressing their expectations from Azerbaijan and Türkiye to avoid experiencing a new national trauma. However, the patriotic fervor at sporting events and the incidents where Iranian government truck convoys carrying weapons to Armenia were blocked by popular protests during the Azerbaijan-Armenia War suggest that the south Azerbaijani identity has become more developed.
An overall popular unrest in populated cities is another option, and maybe much more effective, though. The U.S./Israeli intervention has invalidated such an option due to religious justifications. Considering the military activity of the duo and ethnic sensitivities, it would be useful to look at Iran's options as well.
Iran
Iran is a country that is aware of its sensitivities. Initially, with a backward-looking security approach, the Mullah regime aimed to implement the Shiite crescent project across Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. However, it knew when to withdraw from Syria due to changing power dynamics, and in Lebanon, it failed to deliver the hoped-for support to Hezbollah. The same Iran encouraged rebellion by establishing a command center in Hasakah, where the YPG had their headquarters along with pro-Assad former soldiers from Syria's coastal region, while attempting to diminish Türkiye's influence in Iraq and Syria by supplying drone technology to the PKK. However, alongside the increase in threats from the U.S. and Israel, it has strengthened its defense measures. It also initiated diplomatic efforts with the U.S. through Türkiye in Istanbul, but worried about Ankara, and later assigned Oman to handle these talks.
Iran, which had used diplomacy to buy time and boost its readiness for the upcoming war, was not caught off guard by the U.S./Israeli attack. However, the death of 28 high-level political, religious leaders, and commanders, including Khamenei, in the initial strikes shocked the country. Implementing its defense plan, Iran – expecting a prolonged war – attacked Gulf countries that could supply large amounts of ammunition and ballistic missiles to pressure the U.S. and Israel. At this point, a major strategic mistake occurred. Iran, aiming to influence oil prices to deter the U.S., caused Gulf countries to lose their neutrality, which allowed opposition to Iran to grow as a common ground.
As a result of Iran's misguided strategy, sufficient pressure could not be exerted on Israeli and U.S. targets. For example, U.S. naval assets were not targeted. Instead, the Iranian navy was defeated. One reason for this is Iran's military technological inadequacy, which resulted from years of embargo and sanctions. By focusing on rocket and missile production through reverse engineering, Iran failed to understand that a conventional war requires an integrated structure and that its resources were insufficient to develop this technology.
In the context of military requirements, the lack of position intelligence and target development is clearly evident, while the inaccuracy in targeting military facilities is striking. A military plan that relies on rockets, missiles, and guided munitions requires precise intelligence. However, Iran can only hit nearby areas when targeting military facilities due to a lack of accuracy and intelligence.
The reasoning behind Iran's human-centered, weak military structure and its goal of pressuring the U.S. and Israel by inflicting casualties through long-range strikes is worth explaining. Early in the operation, Iran launched rockets, loitering munitions, and a small number of cruise missiles. The main strategy depends on the low radar signature of loitering munitions, the low cost of rockets, and the need for the U.S. and Israel to face high costs when countering these threats. As the operation progresses, Iran is saving its advanced and long-range hypersonic missiles for later stages, expecting a reduction in the availability of precision munitions for the U.S. and Israel. This approach is based on the belief that the EU and Israel cannot affect Iran's long-range missile stockpiles through airstrikes and sabotage. However, if this strategy succeeds, more aggressive missile strikes against Israeli cities and American facilities should be expected.
While tankers in the Gulf and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz emerge as key methods of warfare, concerns in Iran have grown, initially about defending the country, then about the regime's security, and finally about its territorial integrity. It seems likely that stricter measures will be implemented at home in response to a potential disintegration. In an environment without U.S. and Israeli ground operations, Iranian security forces might adopt a more relaxed yet aggressive approach toward ethnic communities and insurgency efforts. However, it is important to note that this harsh strategy could accelerate fragmentation, while positive rhetoric might yield better outcomes than negative actions.
Conclusion:
In Iran, U.S./Israeli intervention remains in its early stages. In the coming weeks, options for slowing down the pace of U.S. and Israeli operations and experimenting with different strategies might gain momentum. The political environment and logistical issues could delay the U.S. Although military needs might cause a slowdown, political pressures to accelerate could alter the course of the war. While Gulf countries prioritize their own security, the U.S. also needs to reassess its priorities toward these nations. Otherwise, we might see a U.S. that supports Israel but is destined to be outside the Middle East.
Iran, meanwhile, could deploy its long-range missiles more broadly without depending on air and air defense forces. However, this decision is not what will end the war. The outcome will be decided by the Iranian and American people themselves. From the Israeli government's view, this war is just an electoral tactic for Netanyahu and a way to use the U.S. as a proxy. Similar to the coalition formed by the Kurds, the Iranian military can suppress isolated uprisings that might be supported by U.S. and Israeli special forces, besides their air power.
On the other hand, for Iran, responding collectively to different ethnic groups' street protests and acts of defiance presents a difficult challenge. The Kurds have signaled their intentions by forming the Iranian Kurdistan Political Coalition. The Balochis, with their strong tribal structure and well-armed status, are in a position more favorable to anti-Iranian movements, even if directed against Pakistan. South Azerbaijanis, as the largest ethnic group, have the potential to transform the entire country. However, issues with weapons and political organization need external support to be addressed.
