The June 24 elections will, in many respects, be elections of “firsts” for Turkey. For the first time, presidential and parliamentary elections will be held together, and some political parties will participate in the elections through alliances. Moreover, following these elections, the constitutional amendments approved in the April 16 referendum will fully come into effect, and the new governmental system will be implemented.
In addition to all these aspects that make the elections the main topic of the national agenda, another issue frequently raised from time to time concerns the security and fairness of the elections, and the legal and administrative measures taken in this regard. Similar to allegations of security breaches and irregularities made during recent elections—particularly the decision to consolidate ballot boxes—these issues have already begun to be discussed for the upcoming vote.
However, both the institutional mechanisms for the management and oversight of elections in Turkey—enshrined directly in the Constitution—and the country’s seventy years of multi-party election experience demonstrate that such claims are unfounded.
Before addressing both the general regulations and recent measures taken regarding election security, two points should be highlighted:
First, as a problem arising from advancing technology and communication channels, it is now clear that interference in elections has become highly diversified, making it impossible to counter these solely with traditional methods. As seen in allegations surrounding the most recent presidential elections in the United States and the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom, even the most developed countries are susceptible to such manipulations. In Turkey, it is impossible for the Supreme Election Council (YSK) or other election boards to counter these risks alone. Therefore, all relevant state institutions—particularly those in the field of information technology—will take the necessary precautions. It should also be underlined that no such issues have ever been witnessed in Turkish elections to date.
The second issue is the terrorist organization PKK’s pressure on voters, candidates, and parties, which prevents elections from taking place in a free and open environment. Particularly in the June 7 elections, the PKK and its urban structures exploited the Peace Process to carry out such actions. However, it can be said that the security measures taken by the state in recent years, as well as the legal regulations to be discussed shortly, have largely eliminated these threats.
Elections in Turkey Are Managed by an Independent Judiciary Under Party Oversight
Although the first multi-party elections in Turkey were held in 1946, due to undemocratic practices such as “open voting, secret counting,” May 14, 1950, is considered the true start date of honest multi-party elections. In other words, Turkey has nearly seventy years of multi-party election experience. If we include the elections held during the Ottoman Constitutional Monarchy period, this experience dates even further back.
Following the transition to a multi-party system, the 1950 Election Law established election boards in provinces and districts, as well as the YSK in Ankara, to manage and oversee elections impartially and fairly. The 1961 and 1982 Constitutions also stipulated that elections would be held under the administration and supervision of the judiciary, assigning this duty to the YSK.
In democratic countries, there are various models for election administration and oversight. Broadly speaking, there are two main methods: entrusting this duty to parliaments or to independent judicial bodies. Turkey has adopted the second model and, as in some other countries, has entrusted not only oversight but also the administration of elections to the judiciary. In this regard, the YSK is defined in the Constitution and laws as a body with extensive administrative and judicial powers over elections. Thus, the YSK has the authority to perform all procedures related to the conduct of elections from start to finish and to resolve objections.
According to the Constitution, YSK members are elected by the General Assemblies of the Court of Cassation and the Council of State from among their own members, with no influence from any political body. Moreover, political party representatives also serve at the YSK, participating in all deliberations and work but without voting rights (Law No. 298, Art. 17). Similarly, political party representatives are present in provincial and district election boards. In other words, elections are administered by an independent judiciary, and all actions of this judicial body are carried out under the supervision of the parties participating in the election.
Beyond the judiciary’s role, the formation of ballot boxes, voting, and vote counting are all carried out under judicial supervision with the participation of political parties. On election day, in addition to the ballot box chair (a public official), political parties participating in the election can appoint members to the ballot box committee. The counting of votes at the ballot box, their consolidation at district and provincial election boards, and finally the determination of each party’s vote totals and the distribution of parliamentary seats all occur entirely under the observation of political parties. Considering that major parties are well-organized and work effectively at ballot boxes, claims about the insecurity of voting and counting processes prove unfounded.
The Election Security Law and the Consolidation of Ballot Boxes
In addition to these general provisions, a series of legal amendments introducing new measures have been enacted in recent months. Chief among these is the law widely referred to in public as the “Election Security Law,” passed on March 13, 2018. This law introduced regulations not only on election security but also on adapting to the constitutional changes and on electoral alliances.
First, provisions prohibiting political parties from forming alliances in parliamentary elections were repealed, and the principles of electoral alliances were defined. To increase participation, the YSK was authorized to set up mobile ballot boxes for bedridden voters due to illness or disability. As in the constitutional amendment, the age for parliamentary candidacy was lowered from 25 to 18.
For election security, measures were introduced to prohibit campaigning in buildings where voting takes place, to prevent the entry of armed or uniformed individuals other than security forces into these buildings, and to facilitate the role of security forces in ensuring ballot box safety.
The law also addressed the long-debated issue of unstamped envelopes, which came to prominence in previous elections and most recently in the April 16 referendum. Article 9 states:
“However, envelopes without the ballot box committee’s stamp but bearing the watermark, emblem of the Republic of Turkey Supreme Election Council, and the district election board’s stamp, as well as envelopes with stains or marks not definitively proven to have been made for the purpose of placing a special sign, shall be considered valid.”
Accordingly, if an envelope bears the YSK watermark, emblem, and district election board stamp, the vote cannot be deemed invalid simply because the ballot box committee’s stamp was omitted. This prevents voters’ ballots from being wasted due to an error by the ballot box committee.
The most debated provision on election security concerns the consolidation of ballot boxes and voter lists. Article 2 of the law stipulates:
“If deemed necessary for election security, upon the request of the governor or the president of the provincial election board at least one month before voting day, a decision may be made to move ballot boxes in that area to the nearest electoral districts, consolidate ballot box districts, merge electoral districts (except for neighborhood headman elections), arrange voter lists in mixed form, and announce these matters.”
The purpose, as stated in the law’s rationale, is to ensure that voters can exercise their rights freely without influence or pressure, particularly in places where ensuring election security might be difficult. It also allows moving ballot boxes within the same neighborhood in cases of natural disasters.
This aims mainly to prevent the PKK from exerting pressure on voters, candidates, or parties in small, remote settlements. Consolidating ballot boxes and mixing voter lists helps protect ballot secrecy and shields voters from post-election intimidation.
Critics argue that since governors are appointed by the government, they might request moves favoring the ruling party. However, only the YSK—not governors—can decide on ballot box consolidation, and governors hold this request authority because they oversee public security in their provinces.
Furthermore, ballot box relocation occurs within the same electoral district and only over short distances; YSK has set a maximum of five kilometers. Therefore, this is not a case of gerrymandering.
For the June 24 elections, the YSK reviewed requests from governors and approved moving ballot boxes in certain areas of 19 provinces, affecting 144,000 voters. YSK President Sadi Güven stated that the aim was to ensure voters could go to the polls freely, while limiting the distance to avoid reducing turnout.
The Constitutional Court, on May 31, 2018, rejected a case seeking annulment of these provisions, ruling that although moving ballot boxes imposes a limitation on the right to vote, it is an acceptable and proportionate restriction in a democratic society for the sake of election security, without infringing the essence of the right.
Conclusion
Given Turkey’s election experience and the new measures taken, it can be said that the June 24 elections will be held in a secure and free manner. Past objections and complaints have generally been made by those who lost the elections and have not been based on concrete evidence. For example, the many allegations that surfaced as soon as the June 7 elections began disappeared once the results became clear. This shows that all irregularity claims were result-oriented. Therefore, trust should be placed in the election judiciary, and the will of the voters should be respected.
