Burhanettin Duran received his BA in Political Science and International Relations from Bogazici University in 1993, and his Ph.D. in Political Science from Bilkent University in 2001. He was a visiting scholar at George Mason University in 2010-2011. Prof. Duran has been focusing on the transformation of Islamism, Turkish Political Thought, Turkish Domestic Politics, Turkish Foreign Policy and Middle Eastern Politics. Currently Prof. Duran is a professor at Ibn Haldun University and General Coordinator of SETA Foundation. On 09th October 2018, Prof. Duran was appointed as member of Turkish Presidency Security and Foreign Policies Council.
Germany's European Union presidency began yesterday.
Given Chancellor Angela Merkel will quit politics in October 2021, she is likely to have a desire to make significant moves in the next six months to leave a lasting mark on European politics.
The Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) opponents suffer from a common condition: failing to understand the nature of power, no matter how hard they try. They cannot grasp the practice of seizing and preserving political power with an eye on internal and external factors. For a long time, I attributed that shortcoming to the opposition’s prolonged lack of proximity to power. I imagined that they simply had no experience with the difficulty of striking a healthy balance between the development and implementation of policy and the generation of legitimacy needed to maintain one’s power. I was obviously aware that their commitment to neo-nationalist, Kemalist and leftists ideologies effectively blinded them, perpetuating their weakness.
Tensions between Turkey and France have escalated over Libya. The latter is part of a group of countries infuriated by putschist Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s most recent military defeats. Having failed to stop a Turkish vessel en route to Tripoli, Paris now seeks to limit Ankara’s room to maneuver through the European Union and NATO. French President Emmanuel Macron announced that his government would not allow Turkey’s “dangerous game” in Libya, as his foreign minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, urged the EU to discuss the future of its relationship with the Turks “with nothing ruled out, without being naive.” He attempted to justify his call with reference to the organization’s own interests.
As the Libyan putschist Gen. Khalifa Haftar grows weaker, his sponsors begin to speak louder. Building on angry statements from Greece and France, Egypt raised the ante by taking a fresh step. That country’s usurper president, Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, declared an attack on Sirte and Jufra a "red line" for Cairo and threatened to "directly intervene" in Libya.
Ankara’s intervention in Libya fueled a fresh debate in European and Middle Eastern capitals on Turkey's role in the world. Reflecting the view that Turkey has evolved into a more powerful player, that discussion has two dimensions: First, it concentrates on the concrete shifts in the balance of power in Syria, Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, it is a propaganda war with lots of speculation about "real" intentions. It would be impossible to make sense of Turkey’s most recent moves, capabilities and objectives without distinguishing those two aspects.