Introduction

The quest of reaching a “secured” environment somehow de-securitizes state actors due to competing “multiple and complex” units, motivated by contradicting goals. Other than states, a range of units are either dependent or challengers to the security architecture of the state actors. Given the spectrum of the individual people, social groups, societies at large, transnational society, non-state actors either armed or not, and finally humanity as a whole, that covers the future generations. The states are concerned, constrained, and committed to achieving security through newly emerging aspects and means. 

The security conceptualizations are comprised of both the hard and soft concerns of modern life. In this sense, the military is the essential pillar of the security establishments. But emerging trends exist within the framework of the intangible factors, such as societal rights and order, prosperity, rule of local and international law, environmental concerns, and human rights. In this sense, equity and respect have become new indicators of a secured life. Accordingly, states are still in charge of responding to the mentioned concerns, but it is a fact that the states fall short of settling the root causes of “modern” threats and concerns, along with protecting the ones who are exposed. Hence, not only the state actors but also the complete range of aforementioned units of analysis have been blended in a search of varying security commitments. On the other hand, the 9/11 attacks beamed a new wave of assessments to review the widening and deepening security themes in modern interpretations of the hard power practices across the new emerging term “homeland,” mainly in the U.S. The usage of this term argues the integrity of the demarcated country against any threat type, even through “pre-emptive measures.” Threat conceptualization has changed, as can be observed by the perceived societal security concerns regarding immigration, the environment, and the future of humanity under the shadow of climate change. 

 

A Visualization of the Global Resilience

Global security has such extraordinary characteristics that states, irrelevant to their strength, fall short of responding through their capacities. Global escalations, which offer a surprising input to our knowledge base, have affected the transformation of average people, society, and humanity in this sense. The term “normal” has been blurring since old-fashioned, modern, and post-modern trends have intertwined with each other. We are experiencing a mixture of old and new conceptualized (or not conceptualized) political phenomena enriched by emerging challenges. Such a composition of complex developments pushes all actors of international politics into perplexity. 

The phenomena of today have shaped our understanding of international and transnational security under the clout of natural disasters, societal mobility, pandemic diseases, climate change, and living standards. There is no unity and resilience to address these emerging risks among the state actors. Awareness has been expanding among individuals, civil society, and the global public. In this context, actors of the international community are encouraging the consciousness to put the concerns on the agenda. This pattern requires resilience, collaborative engagements, and compliance with the prerequisites of the exposed dangers. Unfortunately, the states' commitments to maintaining it at the least tolerable level are not the same as those affected by global security concerns. 

A consensus occurred among state actors to take joint action against the well-circulated threats. Nevertheless, they ignore the issues that have an economic or political impact on the continuity of sovereignty or economic interests and territorial gains. For instance, global climate change has been the theme for most states, in parallel with the demand of individuals or societies. The developing states with vast populations, like India and China, refrain from complying with the Paris Conference decisions, while the U.S. stance is vulnerable to any governmental policy change. In other words, individuals and communities press for a “change,” and states resist while individuals and society themselves challenge the climate objectives by insisting on consumption habits. Like climate challenge, the protectionism in culture and identity has pushed the individual and community to pressure the state. Cultural and identity protectionism have been equated with countering immigration and alienating differences. 

Another case worth scrutinizing is the pandemic of the last two years. There has been a solid stance to fight against COVID-19 on all levels and in every unit of international politics. But vaccine diplomacy, affiliated with the vaccine economy, diverted the firm stance to a competitive pattern of the states to profit most from the vaccine sales. Economic consequences of the pandemic, on the other hand, boosted the concerns about political security and, for some countries, regime continuity. In other words, the pandemic could not prevent conflicts across the globe, like in Syria and Libya, even though its consequences can devastate the order of the international political system. It has caused a move away from the dedicated cooperation and grants of the developed states to the least developed ones, resulting in symbolic commitments.

Global concerns, as depicted with the emerging “soft” threats and challenging situations listed above, are not only about the experienced traumas in our lives but cover a broader spectrum. The newly emerging concerns can form a long list like digital currencies, space mining, cultural expansion, shaping consumption habits, digital space, or importing the “brains” from the developing states. These new challenges will be on our agendas as people and society feel their impact in the ordinary course of their lives, surpassing the degree of toleration. Hence states or groups of them will be compelled to compete for more gain or the most protectionism against the new interpretations of security.

 

Analyzing the Past to Adapt to the New Security Agenda 

The demise of the Soviet Union, or the end of the Cold War, has brought a new era, described mainly by attractive words. For instance, Fukuyama's The End of History celebrated the triumph of capitalism, while the United States of America (USA) was perceived as a “hyperpower” by some American scholars. Meanwhile, the scholars of International Relations focused on alternative readings of the theoretical debates. Peace operations of the post-Cold War era, concurrent to the Agenda for Peace of Boutros-Ghali, introduced and justified new sorts of interventions. But the 9/11 attacks and the Arab Spring introduced many new concepts, mainly emanating from the practices of the states, such as the War on Terror, pre-emptive strikes, demography conflicts, asymmetric warfare, hybrid war, or proxy conflicts, etc. 

Other than global peace and conflict trends, Russia-based concerns of 2020 reiterated a crucial fact to the globe. Russian expansionism, essentially toward Europe, mirrored the Cold War conflicts, which can be reviewed by conventionality – unconventionality, regularity – irregularity, or stability operations, although the new concepts enriched the old ones. This pattern, which I call “robust-security,” will require formulating modified strategies across the globe, spanning from individual to supra-states, considering the old and new concerns.

 

Strategy-Making for Multilayered and Multilateral Security

Strategy-making of this era, with its obligation to address the complicated structures and threats, requires flexible and critical thinking with intelligent technologies. The policymakers must consider more dynamics, actors, and variables of all sorts with an analysis and synthesis capacity. As options increase for all brands of actors in the international realm, predictability becomes compelling. In other words, the probability of “misunderstanding” and “miscalculation,” which may spark conflicts, has become a risk for peace and stability. Besides, the features of the contemporary era, which are integrating modernity and pre-modernity with new interpretations, require all international community actors to invent sui generis modus operandi for all courses of political, economic, military, or environmental actions. As a result, the strategy-making of today must address multilayered concerns of “unusual” situations to prepare for the worst-case scenarios. 

For all sorts of actors and amid the new security environment, the strategy-making process needs to cover the emerging structure of today's politics. In this context, actors prefer to use multilateralism as the new mood of the day. This phase involves the existing superpower – the USA, and the potential ones with long-term projections like Russia, China, or the EU. For instance, Russia is concerned about re-establishing the former Soviet “sphere of influence,” while the People's Republic of China (PRC) aims to be a superpower to honor the 100th anniversary of the PRC with a pledge to the teachings of Mao and Deng Xiaoping. On the other hand, the USA is committed to countering the emerging superpowers while building a checks and balances mechanism with its Allies and partners. One can, then, question multipolarity and whether it brings stability as the Cold War achieved through the mutually assured destruction or impose a “Cold Peace” to sustain the low-intensity conflicts with emerging modus operandi. The situation in this international politics expands the courses but strains the states' options. 

 

Regionalism's Scattered Structure

Other than global politics, there exists another complexity of actors, dynamics, and events in the regional systems. Buzan's regional security complex includes new, uncontrollable inputs that mean the classic balance of power or bandwagoning strategies do not fit modern concerns. For instance, the Gulf countries are beyond their traditional area of interest but reach out to vast regions, rather than just the Gulf itself, with their wealth, only to compete. 

“Globalism” pushes these states to observe the concerns of their citizens due to the trauma of the Arab Spring (or winter) while demonstrating that their regimes (not their state) can play a challenging role, only for credibility. On the other hand, there has been no change in searching for security from the external actors with their rentier economies. Compared to the Gulf countries, the Middle East appeared to have more regional systems inside with a multilayered regional system. On the other hand, regionalism in Central Asia, the Balkans, or the Caucasus mirrors the Cold War era. As a result, regions have their sui generis characteristics. Nevertheless, the region’s complexities can bring back the traditional threat perceptions of the Cold War. 

States and the organizations the states make are short of covering the cobweb of individuals and communities. The strength of individuals has vastly increased in the last two decades thanks to communication technology and human mobility. The interaction among the individuals of different communities has created new communities of interest as pressure groups on the state actors. States are not in total control of the individuals with a concern about maintaining the state and regime securities. The fundamental challenge to the state is loyalty, sacrifice, and the dedication of the communities. Hence, a self-organizing body of individuals and their collectivity exist with unique interests, concerns, and commitments. This picture compels states to take conservative measures for preserving the societal order inside while encouraging a change abroad through access to the digital world. Hence, transnationalism is a threat to the state but inspired by the state for a controlled transformation in other actors. 

After all the discussion on global and regional systems (and sub-systems), the scrutinized themes denote changes in the structure of actors and engagements in the international system. Traditional responses are still valid, but the expansion and depth of the sectors and units in international politics entered a new phase. The essential features of this new phase are the unsteadiness, intertwined dynamics, and degradation consequences. In this sense, neither of the international situations can be fixed for a particular course but needs a flexible approach. The intertwined nature of the actors and dynamics requires a multidimensional response to the problems. Their synergy makes the new threats and concerns devastating for all actors, surpassing the capacity of any actor. Finally, degradation is about nature, humans, ethics, societies, and politics. Once degradation starts, norms and standards will be ostensible arrangements that international actors would use to normalize the conflicts, disregarding Jus ad Bellum or Jus in Bello. Finally, transnationalism consists of paradoxes for sustainable changes like the composition and course of the international system.

Then, questions arise about whether we should return to the original settings of international politics or maintain the complex transformation via concise and precise engagements.

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