Who are Displeased With the Striking of ISIS?

Aug. 28-29, Turkish jets took off from İncirlik Air Base and hit positions of the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Syria with the coalition forces led by the U.S. The goal was to clear off the Azez-Jarabulus line from ISIS, turn the line into a safe zone and to submit the control of the area to the Syrian opposition.

Turkey’s active participation in the Genuine Determination Operation was awaited since the agreement was made on July 22. The delay was justified for some “technical arrangements” that the U.S. would undertake for the coordination. The essence of the matter regards who will take control of the region once ISIS has been cleared. While Turkey thinks that Turkmen and some moderate Islamist groups could take control, the U.S. does not trust in any Islamist group. The cause of the long-lasting “technical” regulations was related to the measures the U.S. took on its own. As a result, with signing the technical document on Aug. 24 and the following bombings, Turkey officially and efficaciously became involved in the operation against ISIS. Upon this new development, ISIS threatened the country and declared it an unbeliever, as can be guessed.

Some articles published in Western media outlets underlined that Turkey deceived the U.S. or the ISIS bombings were used to cover the operations targeting the outlawed PKK. Eric Edelman’s article published in The New York Times and Patrick Cockborn’s article published in The Independent are examples. Both articles warn the U.S. not to lose the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian wing of the PKK, which has shown to be a significant force in the fight against ISIS.

The first article suggested imposing pressure on Turkey with a sort of boycott at international institutions. The second article encouraged the U.S. to use its bases in Jordan, Bahrain and the Gulf and abandon the İncirlik base. I do not think that Obama administration would take those offers very seriously. But still, we must ponder upon the meaning of this disfavor.

The grounds of the disfavor are actually related to the fact that the Syrian policies of Turkey and the U.S. have never been in line with each other in the exact sense. The Syrian policy of the Obama administration, which has not adopted an active stance to overthrow the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, has turned the country into a geography of “fights by proxy” and “sub-state groups.” The dominance of ISIS in a wide area in Iraq and Syria was rendered possible in such an environment. The U.S. also follows a fragmented and low-level policy in its fight against ISIS. By including the local agents – peshmerga units and the PYD – and regional forces – Turkey and Iran – into the crisis, it wishes to lead the fight against ISIS.

Turkey has approached both the Syrian civil war and the ISIS matter with its own national priorities and timing. The policy of the Obama administration paved the way for the PYD until recently. A PYD circle was nearly formed in northern Syria. The formation of such a circle controlled by the PKK and the PYD would mean serious problems for Turkey and the Arabs, Turkmen and other Kurdish groups in Syria. The opening of İncirlik to coalition forces and the engagement of safe zone has stopped this course of events for now.

However, some subjects between Turkey and the U.S. regarding north Syria have yet to be clarified. The discussions regarding who will take control of the Azez-Jarabulus line after ISIS is cleared out will continue. But still, the U.S. does not want to interrupt the fight against ISIS by undermining the PYD due to Turkey’s operations against the PKK.

One way to prevent this is reinitiating the reconciliation process by forcing the PKK to declare a cease-fire. Another way is to include Turkey more intensively in the fight against ISIS, which would be performed in accordance with the priorities of the U.S.

It is thought that this might be realized with pressure imposed on Turkey, which has been experiencing inner turbule