US and the Gulf after Camp David

In the aftermath of nuclear talks between Iran and P5+1 countries, the U.S. is facing a more complicated relationship with Gulf countries. It seems that the Camp David summit was not very successful in refreshing Gulf countries' confidence in the U.S. as a diplomatic ally.

The meeting of Gulf leaders with the U.S. administration ended last week. Once again – despite some rhetorical good will messages following the meetings – it seems that not much has changed in regards to U.S. relations with the Gulf countries. For the most part, the final declaration repeated the security interests of the U.S. and its partners in the region; however, at least according to the public statements, problems that arose between the U.S. and other Gulf states following the Iranian nuclear deal were not totally resolved. The only positive development was a statement of support by the Gulf countries in regards to the Iranian nuclear deal if the security interests of these countries are properly met. At least for cosmetic reasons this statement helped President Obama; however, again it is important to remember that skepticism is still there and will remain so.

Following the meeting, Gulf leaders returned to their countries without a security agreement or more integrated air defense systems to balance the potential threat from Iran. According to reports, instead there will be substantial military assistance for these countries that may include weapons and systems that will provide security against maritime threats, possible missile strikes and cyberattacks. However, even these types of support and verbal commitments during the press conference did not entail a binding U.S. commitment to protect the territories and citizens of Gulf countries if they are attacked by Iran. Most probably, such an outcome was obvious during the preparation phase of the meeting, and it might have had a big role in King Salman’s change-of-mind and some other Gulf country leaders with regards to attending the meeting. This cancellation also demonstrated problems in the organization of the summit.

Of course, securing a security alliance with the U.S. against Iran was the most significant issue at the meeting, as the invitation to these leaders was publicly extended in the immediate aftermath of the framework agreement between Iran and the P5+1. However, what complicates relations between the U.S. and these states and what made the Camp David meeting extra challenging was the existence of multiple problems in the triangle of Iran, the U.S. and the Gulf countries. Consequently, when the Iran issue was being discussed with the Gulf countries, the nonproliferation of this country and its nuclear program was only one of the variables. In fact, although the most significant agenda item at the meeting was the Iranian nuclear deal and the concerns of Gulf leaders about the conventional threat posed by the Iranian regime, other very significant issues, including the war in Yemen, the civil war in Syria and the war against ISIS in Iraq, were behind the thinking of all these leaders. Although the U.S. administration, since the beginning of the nuclear deal with Iran, tried to isolate other policies of the Iranian government, including its actions in Syria and its human rights violations, from the nuclear issue, for the GCC members these issues are all part of a bigger problem of Iranian expansionism in the region.

A second problem during the meetings was the concerns of the Gulf countries about the commitments of the U.S. and its vision of developments in the Middle East. Six years ago after a period of serious discord between the U.S. and the Islamic world due to the war in Iraq and the problems in its aftermath, President Obama addressed the Arab world in Cairo and signaled the beginning of a new era between the U.S. and the people in this part of the world. There were high hopes in the Middle East about a serious revision, damage control and confidence building in relations between the U.S. and the Arab world. However, in a short period of time it turned out that most of what was said during this speech was rhetorical, and there was not much policy preparation or strategy design to match the rhetoric.

The pivot to Asia resulted in major concerns for some Gulf States. Many during this period co

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